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Michael S. Lewis 
Confronting a Monument: The Great Chief Justice in an 
Age of Historical Reckoning 
17 U.N.H. L. Rev. 315 (2019) 
A B S T R A C T .   The year 2018 brought us two new studies of Chief Justice John Marshall.  Together, 
they provide a platform for discussing Marshall and his role in shaping American law.  They also 
provide a platform for discussing the uses of American history in American law and the value of 
an historian’s truthful, careful, complete, and accurate accounting of American history, 
particularly in an area as sensitive as American slavery. 
One of the books reviewed, Without Precedent, by Professor Joel Richard Paul, provides an 
account of Chief Justice Marshall that is consistent with the standard narrative.  That standard 
narrative has consistently made a series of unsupported and ahistorical claims about Marshall 
over the course of two centuries.  The substantial errors contained in this standard narrative are 
exposed by another book, Supreme Injustice, by Professor Paul Finkelman, which reveals, in 
groundbreaking fashion, Chief Justice Marshall’s deep personal and professional commitment to, 
and investment in, the institution of American slavery.   
Chief Justice Marshall’s commitment to an institution that has been rejected by our law and 
by pervasive social norms should give his modern successors, attorneys, judges or students of the 
law, as well as citizens, substantial pause when relying upon Marshall as a posthumous authority 
and reference point in debates regarding contemporary legal subjects.  Any other conclusion 
would countenance an unjustified double-standard when assessing American historical figures 
whose conduct we would condemn if perpetrated by historical figures from foreign nations. 
A U T H O R .   Shareholder at Rath, Young and Pignatelli, P.C. and an Adjunct Professor of Law at the 
University of New Hampshire School of Law.  I am deeply grateful to William Ardinger, Jean 
Galbraith, Kate Galbraith, John Greabe, Daniel Feltes, Keenan Kmiec, Linda Krieger, Michael 
Perez, Steve Lauwers, John M. Lewis, Madeline Lewis, Michael McCann, Adam Plunkett, David 
Plunkett, Leah Plunkett, Chris Sullivan, and Kevin Scura for their assistance and thoughts on this 
review.  Special thanks to Hon. James Bassett, Associate Justice of the New Hampshire Supreme 
Court, Hon. Paul Barbadoro, United States District Judge of the United States District Court for 
the District of New Hampshire, Hon. Jeffrey Sutton, United States Circuit Judge of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, and Hon. Jed S. Rakoff, Senior United States District 
Judge of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York for their 
comments and general guidance and example over time. 
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Reviewing: 
Without Precedent: John Marshall and His Times.  By Joel Richard Paul.  
Riverhead Books.  2018.  Pp. 502.  $30.00. 
 
Supreme Injustice: Slavery in the Nation’s Highest Court.  By Paul 
Finkelman.  Harvard University Press.  2018.  Pp. 287.  $35.00. 
 
My friend . . . a measure in such things, which in any way falls short of that which is, is 
no measure at all.  For nothing incomplete is the measure of anything.1 
  
                                                                    
1  Plato, The Republic, in The Republic of Plato 184 (Allan Bloom trans., 2d ed. 1968) (Socrates 
to Adeimantus). 
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I NT R ODUC T I ON 
In New Hampshire, where I live, practice law, and now teach law, the Dartmouth 
College case2 harkens to a time when this state played a consequential role in the fate 
of this nation at its early stages.3  New England lawyers treasure the region’s rich 
history and its connection to the dawning years of the American Republic.  Even in 
the year of its bicentennial, many lawyers here can still tell you that the Dartmouth 
College case was a dramatic event in our national past.  A towering native son, Daniel 
Webster, stood before the nation’s highest court and moved its great Chief Justice 
to tears with an ode to New Hampshire’s most prestigious college.4  Speaking to 
Chief Justice John Marshall, indeed, turning to face him, Webster—the 
Massachusetts Senator whose statue now stands in the plaza outside New 
Hampshire’s capitol building—declared in open court: 
Sir, you may destroy this little institution; it is weak, it is in your hands! . . . But, if you 
do so, you must carry through your work!  You must extinguish, one after another, all 
those greater lights of science, which, for more than a century, have thrown their 
radiance over our land! . . . It is sir, as I have said, a small college.  And yet there are those 
who love it.5 
                                                                    
2  Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819); see also Kathie Ragsdale, 
Those Who Love It: Justice Bassett Leads Commemoration of Dartmouth Case, 29 N.H. B. News 8 (Jan. 16, 
2019), at 1, https://www.nhbar.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/BN-Final-1-16-19.pdf [https:
//perma.cc/U3KE-USG4] (“The court’s landmark decision, involving application of the [C]ontracts 
[C]lause of the U.S. Constitution, upheld the sanctity of contracts and became a foundation for no 
less than the American system of free enterprise.”). 
3  See, e.g., Susan E. Marshall, The New Hampshire Constitution 9 (2015) (“New 
Hampshire claims the distinction of being the first place in the world where a convention was 
elected and met for the sole purpose of drawing up a constitution, to be adopted when submitted 
to and approved by popular referendum.”); see also Joanne B. Freeman, The Field of Blood: 
Violence in Congress and the Road to Civil War (2018) (exploring the observations of 
Benjamin Brown French, New Hampshire native and clerk to the United States House of 
Representatives from 1844–1847). 
4  Joel Richard Paul, Without Precedent: John Marshall and His Times 377 (2018).  But 
see R. Kent Newmyer, Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story: Statesman of the Old 
Republic 131 (1985) (describing Justice Joseph Story’s role in the case, “not as an impartial observer 
but as an active partisan of the college (which later gave him an honorary degree) and a confidant 
and advisor of its chief counsel, Daniel Webster”). 
5  Paul, supra note 4 (first alteration in original); see also Elmer Ebenezer Studley, The 
Dartmouth College Case: History and Sequence, in Historical Theses and Dissertations 
Collection, Paper 17, 27 (1894).  Discussing the undoubted influence Daniel Webster had on the 
Court through his “great” oratory skills, Studley expounds:  
Mr. Goodrich, an eye witness of the trial, has left us an account of it.  He says that Chief-Justice Marshall’s 
eyes were suffused with tears, and that the countenance of Mr. Justice Washington was as pale and livid 
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As the story of the Dartmouth College case goes, Marshall issued an historic ruling, 
sparing an emerging college from the predations of a power-hungry state 
government seeking to control it.6  In this recounting, Chief Justice Marshall is a 
judicial hero whose decisions laid the groundwork for a more perfect union.7  This 
perspective on Chief Justice Marshall has hardened over two centuries of history-
writing about him.  Most of his biographers have come to rank him among greatest 
of the founding generation.8  His famous successor, Chief Justice Earl Warren, 
wrote of Marshall: 
                                                                    
as marble.  The other members of the court were also deeply moved, while the entire audience seemed 
spell-bound.   
Id. 
6  See Paul, supra note 4, at 379 (“But the nation’s colleges and other charitable institutions 
breathed a sigh of relief.”); see also Gordon S. Wood, Empire of Liberty 466 (2009) (“Although 
Marshall and his Court could scarcely have grasped the momentous implications for American 
business of their Dartmouth College decision, the decision did result in placing all private 
corporations under the protection of the United States Constitution. . . . They became private 
property belonging to individuals, not the state.”).  But see Lynn W. Turner, William Plumer of 
New Hampshire 1759–1850 246–47 (1962) (describing New Hampshire’s generous history of 
contributing to the welfare of the college through state funding); John S. Whitehead & Jurgen 
Herbst, How to Think About the Dartmouth College Case, 26 Hist. Educ. Q. 333, 334 (1986) (“The 
traditional interpretation portrayed the Dartmouth College case as a major watershed in in 
educational history; it clearly affirmed the existence of the public/private distinction by 1819.  After 
a close observation of the available documents on the case, I revised the traditional interpretation.  
The case, I concluded, was not a watershed . . . . In fact, I could find few people except Justices 
Joseph Story and John Marshall who were particularly interested in the distinction.”). 
7  For a survey of approaches to biographical work on Marshall, see Edward L. Barrett, Jr., Chief 
Justice John Marshall: A Reappraisal, by W. Melville Jones, 9 J. Legal Educ. 424 (1957) (book review); 
Cassius M. Clay, Chief Justice John Marshall: A Reappraisal, by W. Melville Jones, 55 Register of 
the Kentucky Hist. Soc’y 378 (1957) (book review). 
8  See, e.g., R. Kent Newmyer, John Marshall and the Heroic Age of the Supreme Court 
xvi (2001) (“To save the Framers’ Constitution from the resurgent forces of democratic localism 
and states’ rights theory, he helped put the Supreme Court, the weakest of the three branches in 
1800, at the epicenter of the constitutional government of America. . . . For reasons I hope to show, 
John Marshall remains America’s representative jurist; a judge for all seasons.”); Jean Edward 
Smith, John Marshall Definer of a Nation 1 (1996) (“John Marshall was the fourth Chief 
Justice of the United States. . . . Under his leadership, the Supreme Court became a dominant force 
in American life.  The broad powers of the federal government, the authoritative role of the Court, 
and a legal environment conducive to the growth of the American economy stem from the 
decisions that flowed from Marshall’s pen.”).  But see Michael J. Klarman, How Great Were the “Great” 
Marshall Court Decisions?, 87 Va. L. Rev. 1111, 1146 (2001) (“While it is impossible to measure 
precisely the impact of the[] [Dartmouth College case and other Contract Clause] decisions, it is a 
safe bet that they were much less important than is conventionally assumed.”). 
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Today, we appraise him as we do a lofty mountain peak—not by the crevices, jagged 
rocks and slides that are so apparent at close view, but by the height, the symmetry and 
the grandeur it acquires in the perspective of distance.   
Thus viewed, John Marshall stands out as a colossus among the giants of his time.9 
Perhaps inspired by a desire to reaffirm the importance of the judicial branch 
in an era in which so many important national controversies have been resolved by 
the courts, the year 2018 has yielded another book in the tradition of praising 
Marshall as a great monument of our national past and to the United States 
Supreme Court.10  Professor Joel Richard Paul, an international law scholar at the 
University of California, Hastings, has written Without Precedent: John Marshall and 
His Times.11  Professor Paul depicts Chief Justice Marshall as an international 
statesman who sought to protect the nation from domestic and international 
threats and served as the historical precursor to Abraham Lincoln in the story of 
national unity and freedom.12  As the title of his book suggests, Paul believes 
Marshall drew on a blank slate without models for his work and performed 
mightily.13  On the book jacket accompanying the hardcover version, Professor 
Laurence Tribe, the famed Harvard Law School constitutional scholar, endorses 
Paul’s project: 
I would have predicted that there was nothing worth saying about John Marshall that 
                                                                    
9  Earl Warren, Chief Justice John Marshall: A Heritage of Freedom and Stability, 41 A.B.A. J. 1008, 
1009 (1955). 
10  Paul, supra note 4.  For a discussion questioning the need for another such biography, see 
Scott D. Gerber, R. Kent Newmyer’s John Marshall and the Heroic Age of the Supreme Court, 110 
Va. Mag. Hist. & Biography 104 (2002) (book review) (“Put directly, do we really need another 
biography of John Marshall? . . . I must confess that I learned nothing new from Newmyer’s tome.  
The same familiar ground is covered: Marshall’s pre-Court years, his confrontations with Thomas 
Jefferson, his jurisprudence, and the frustrations of his latter years on the Court.  Newmyer tells 
a good story, but it is a story that has been told many times before.”). 
11  Praise for Without Precedent, Penguin Random House, https://www.penguinrandom
house.com/books/309740/without-precedent-by-joel-richard-paul/9781594488238/ [https://
perma.cc/YYV4-LJE9] (last visited Jan. 13, 2019); see Paul, supra note 4. 
12  See Paul, supra note 4, at 2–3 (describing Marshall’s career as a Revolutionary War soldier, 
diplomat, and United States Secretary of State, and his lengthy career as Chief Justice of the 
United States); id. at 440 (closing his biography with the following reflection: “[d]emocracy 
requires practical jurists and statesmen who prefer compromise to chaos and who understand 
that the single-minded pursuit of one’s own ideology at the expense of all else is the path to civil 
war. . . . With his passing, who would save the Union now?”). 
13  See id. (“Though he did not have the benefit of precedent, Marshall creatively navigated his 
way through a thicket of domestic and international controversies, choosing his battles prudently 
and forging consensus where none seemed possible.”). 
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hadn’t already been said.  I would’ve been so wrong.  In every chapter of this page-
turning account of Marshall’s pivotal place in our nation’s history, even the expert will 
learn something new.  How did Joel Paul figure out, for instance, that the great Chief 
Justice probably suborned perjury on his brother’s past during the bizarre Marbury v. 
Madison trial?  You owe it to yourself to read Joel Paul’s terrific book to find out.14 
Professor Harold Hongju Koh, formerly the Dean of Yale Law School, echoes this 
assessment: 
Who was John Marshall, really?  Thousands meet him anew each year solely through his 
published opinions.  But finally, Joel Richard Paul gives us this captivating, 
indispensable account, painting a fascinating picture of the frontiersman, soldier, 
illusionist, strategist, diplomat and international lawyer who became not just the man 
behind Marbury, but so much more.15 
A review of the prior art demonstrates, however, that these endorsements do 
not square with reality and give too much credit to a work that is not sufficiently 
novel to deserve it.16  Indeed, were it not for the publication of another book on 
Marshall in 2018, Professor Paul’s work would likely pass into the ether without 
additional comment.17  This second book on Marshall—Supreme Injustice: Slavery in 
                                                                    
14  See Praise for Without Precedent, supra note 11. 
15   Id.  See generally Faculty Biography of Harold Hongju Koh, Yale L. Sch., https://law.yale.edu
/harold-hongju-koh [https://perma.cc/H3YS-2P8H] (last visited Feb. 11, 2019). 
16  See, e.g., Wood, supra note 6, at 433–68 (outlining Marshall’s activities as a U.S. diplomat, and 
describing, more broadly, the challenges, external and internal, facing the early American 
Republic, devoting substantial space to Marshall’s role in shaping the national judiciary); see also 
Jed S. Rakoff, Hail to the Chief, N.Y. Rev. Books, Nov. 22, 2018, at 40.  Per Rakoff:  
[Albert J.] Beveridge’s biography is largely a panegyric to Marshall, and the titles of more recent 
biographies, such as Jean Edward Smith’s John Marshall: Definer of a Nation (1996) and Howard Giles 
Unger’s John Marshall: The Chief Justice Who Saved the Nation (2014), indicate how much Marshall is still 
viewed with an awe that may inhibit critical thinking. 
Id.  Judge Rakoff goes on to praise Professor Paul’s biography in a review even as he concludes 
with an elliptically critical assessment of Marshall, both in regard to his most famous ruling, 
concerning the petition of the Cherokee Nation, and for the precedent his compromises with the 
executive branch set for individuals seeking relief against government excess.  See id. at 42 (“But I 
do suggest that, for whatever reason, the Supreme Court has frequently been far more deferential 
to the [P]resident than to Congress—and that this imbalance took root in the early days of the 
Court.”). 
17  See Kate Galbraith, ‘Without Precedent,’ by Joel Richard Paul; ‘Supreme Injustice,’ by Paul 
Finkelman, S. F. Chron. (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.sfchronicle.com/books/article/Without-
Precedent-by-Joel-Richard-Paul-12736500.php [https://perma.cc/ZB3F-6FW3] (trenchantly 
noting the simultaneous publishing of the books and commenting that “Paul is unduly gentle on 
this point, seeing Marshall as a product of his time, and more benign than many Virginia 
slaveholders”). 
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the Nation’s Highest Court18—is one whose rendering dramatically contrasts with 
Professor Paul’s.  
In Supreme Injustice, Professor Paul Finkelman, now President of Gratz College, 
the “oldest independent and pluralistic college for Jewish studies in North 
America,”19 casts significant doubt upon Professor Paul’s laudatory description of 
Marshall.  He exposes Marshall’s racism and his support and protection of slavery 
as an institution.20  These perspectives have been ignored or minimized by 
historians, though they were always obvious from the historical record.21  The record 
includes documented facts about Marshall’s personal relationship with and 
investment in slavery, his slavery jurisprudence, and its link to the jurisprudence of 
Marshall’s justifiably vilified successor, Chief Justice Roger Brooke Taney of Dred 
Scott v. Sandford22 notoriety.23  Professor Finkelman’s account of Marshall and his 
colleagues is unsparing from its first sentences: 
This book explores the slavery jurisprudence of the three most important justices 
on the antebellum Supreme Court—Chief Justice John Marshall, Associate Justice 
Joseph Story, and Chief Justice Roger Brooke Taney.  All three believed that slavery—or 
more precisely, opposition to slavery—threatened national unity and political stability. 
. . . The justices I discuss in this book would have argued that anti-slavery was the 
nemesis of the Constitution.  Their goal was to prevent opposition to slavery (and the 
                                                                    
18  Paul Finkelman, Supreme Injustice: Slavery in the Nation’s Highest Court (2018). 
19  About Gratz College, Gratz Coll., https://www.gratz.edu/about-gratz-college 
[https://perma.cc/MVE8-FXAL] (last visited Jan. 13, 2019); Meet the President: Dr. Paul Finkelman 
Brings Passion and Energy to Gratz, Gratz Coll., https://www.gratz.edu/today/meet-president-dr-
paul-Finkelman-brings-passion-and-energy-gratz [https://perma.cc/Y8UY-ZBTL] (last visited 
Jan. 13, 2019). 
20  See Finkelman, supra note 18. 
21  See generally Finkelman, supra note 18, at 9.  According to Finkelman: 
A study of Marshall’s chief justiceship asserts that the Marshall Court “did not deal with the domestic 
institution of slavery.”  Such conclusions can only be reached by ignoring the Court’s many cases on 
slavery.   
 Slavery does not fit comfortably in the narrative of the Supreme Court, where Marshall and Story 
are called great and heroic.  Scholars often try to explain away Dred Scott by claiming it was a mistake or 
an aberration and by ignoring most of Taney’s other slavery jurisprudence.  But slavery does not 
disappear just because scholars ignore it.  Support for human bondage and persistent hostility to the 
rights of free blacks were important components of the Court’s jurisprudence from 1801 until the Civil 
War. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
22  60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
23  See Finkelman, supra note 18, at 9; see also Max Lerner, Nine Scorpions in a Bottle 99 
(1994) (“The Court did not again use judicial review against Congress . . . until the Dred Scott case, 
more than a half century later . . . .”). 
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moral disgust slavery engendered among many Americans) from undermining the 
nation’s constitutional and political arrangements.24  
Professor Finkelman is a well-known legal historian who has spent a large 
portion of his career writing on the interaction between American slavery and 
American law.25  He has challenged historical accounts that would minimize or deny 
the role of American slavery in our history.26  He has even provided greater 
recognition to legal figures who saw the moral hazards of slavery and acted upon 
this perspective, implicitly highlighting the moral transgressions of their 
contemporaries by comparison.27  His historical treatment of Chief Justice Marshall 
is shocking to the American-trained lawyer hitherto deprived of this history, or at 
least to this American-trained lawyer—trained like almost all American attorneys  
                                                                    
24  Finkelman, supra note 18, at 1. 
25  See, e.g., Paul Finkelman, Defending Slavery: Proslavery Thought in the Old South 
vii (2003) (“As this book [documenting early American thought justifying American slavery] goes 
to press, Americans are being asked to consider whether the nation should pay reparations or in 
some other way compensate the descendants of slaves.”); Paul Finkelman, Slavery and the 
Founders 3–35 (2014) (tracking the history of the United States Constitution to the desire to 
perpetuate slavery as a legal practice with political benefits to the American South).  Professor 
Finkelman’s critique of early American constitutional thinking is not without its critics.  See Sean 
Wilenz, No Property in Man: Slavery and Antislavery at the Nation’s Founding 8 (2018) 
(alleging, with little explanation, that Professor Finkelman’s views on the United States 
Constitution are supported by “meager evidence, suspect logic, and at times sheer supposition”); 
see also Allen Mendenhall, The Court’s Supreme Injustice, L.A. Rev. Books (May 24, 2018), 
https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/the-courts-supreme-injustice/#!. [https://perma.cc/Q9QW-
C9D3] (“Paul Finkelman is an anomaly: a historian with no law degree who’s held chairs or 
fellowships at numerous law schools, testified as an expert witness in high-profile cases, and filed 
amicus briefs with several courts . . . . Finkelman specializes in American legal history, slavery and 
the law, constitutional law, and race and the law.”).   
26  See, e.g., Paul Finkelman, The Constitution and the Intentions of the Framers: The Limits of Historical 
Analysis, 50 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 349, 350–52, 357, 371 (1989) (challenging the merits of an intentionalist 
approach to historical and judicial analysis of the framing of the Constitution in part because, 
“[b]y the time of the Revolution, slavery and racial discrimination were entrenched in America’s 
economic, social and legal structure. . . . [which] leads to some troublesome conclusions about the 
intentions of the founders of this nation”).  Finkelman argues that those who advocate for the use 
of an intentionalist approach “would have to acknowledge that the ‘intentions of the framers’ 
include[d] certain ideas and concepts—such as slavery, race discrimination, property and 
religious requirements for voting and officeholding, and the denial of political rights to women—
which are simply not acceptable today.”  Id. at 373.  He asserts that we cannot “interpret[] the 
Constitution according to how we understand the words of the Declaration, [and] interpret[] it 
according to how the framers understood those words.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
27  See, e.g., Paul Finkelman, John McLean: Moderate Abolitionist and Supreme Court Politician, 62 
Vand. L. Rev. 519, 540–41 (2009) (“On the Court, McLean stood out for his opposition to slavery.”). 
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to revere and rejoice in Marshall. 
Finkelman’s book documents Chief Justice Marshall’s deep, personal 
investments in American slavery as well as the many instances in which Marshall 
withheld from slaves seeking freedom the judicial creativity that won him acclaim, 
including the innovative approach Marshall deployed in the Dartmouth College case.28  
In reversal after reversal of lower court decisions granting slaves their freedom, 
Finkelman demonstrates how Marshall returned humans to bondage despite many 
judicial devices at his disposal to rule otherwise.29  In so doing, Marshall displayed 
judicial brutality in the face of the devastation and inhumanity of the peculiar 
institution of American slavery.30  Finkelman’s description of Marshall and his 
judicial decision-making in cases of fundamental importance to his 
contemporaries—the men and women who came before him seeking freedom only 
to be cast back into bondage—is a far cry from Professor Paul’s account.31 
When the tears Marshall shed for Dartmouth are viewed in this light, one is not 
struck by the humanity of Marshall, but rather by his inhumanity.  A sensitive reader 
of both books must ask: why no tears for Mima Queen?32  Hers is a case Finkelman 
highlights to distressing effect.33  Her attorney, Francis Scott Key—author of our 
                                                                    
28  See Finkelman, supra note 18, at 28–29, 97 (“Marshall is remembered as the Great Chief 
Justice because he was bold, brilliant, forceful, and often fearless.  But in slavery cases, Marshall’s 
opinions were cautious, narrow, legalistic, and hostile to freedom.”); see also Hugh Evander Willis, 
The Dartmouth College Case—Then and Now, 19 St. Louis L. Rev. 183, 185 (1934) (“The Chief Justice 
in an obscure way found consideration and all the other essential elements of a contract.  The 
court might have held that even though the charter of a corporation was a contract that it was 
subject to the sovereign power of eminent domain, taxation and the police power. . . . Yet the 
courts have always held that private contracts between private individuals are subject to the 
exercise of these sovereign powers.”). 
29  See Finkelman, supra note 18, at 62–75. 
30  See id. at 56 (footnote omitted) (“The Marshall Court heard fourteen cases involving freedom 
claims.  The chief justice wrote an opinion in seven cases; in each of these, the slave plaintiff lost. 
. . . In these cases Marshall often ignored [applicable state] law or precedent on slavery to rule 
against black plaintiffs, and he never rigorously enforced statutes if doing so would have led to 
black freedom.”). 
31  See id.  See generally Paul, supra note 4. 
32  See Finkelman, supra note 18, at 62–66 (“Mima Queen claimed her freedom on the basis of 
her ancestry.”).  She sought to prove that her great-grandmother was free through the 
presentation of affidavit testimony.  Id. at 62. 
33  See id. at 62–66 (“An active purchaser of slaves on his way to owning hundreds of human 
beings over his lifetime . . . . Marshall claimed he feared that allowing hearsay in freedom suits—
as Maryland law allowed—would threaten property everywhere, although that conclusion was 
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national anthem, an accomplished lawyer, and an unrepentant slaver—sought to 
offer proof that she was free on the basis of her ancestry at trial only to be denied 
the opportunity to present that proof by Marshall’s strict application of the 
prohibition against hearsay.34  Why no tears for Ben, or “Negro Ben,” who sued for 
and won his freedom under Maryland law, only to have that verdict reversed by 
Marshall through a construction of law that dispensed with manner-of-proof 
obligations almost altogether?35  Consider that, for Mima Queen, Ben, and others 
victimized by Chief Justice Marshall and our legal system, all we can provide is an 
acknowledgment by a later generation that they were injured and that their lives 
were stunted by a more powerful contemporary.36   
These are questions Professor Paul’s Without Precedent fails to address because 
Paul lacks an awareness of the scope or existence of Marshall’s slavery 
jurisprudence.  Read against Professor Finkelman’s analysis, Professor Paul’s 
narrative of Chief Justice Marshall’s life purports to describe him for the purpose of 
winning the general readership’s admiration.  Yet it fails to accurately address 
Marshall’s personal history as a slaveholder and his role in promoting slavery 
                                                                    
patently absurd.  Marshall might have easily limited the use of this evidence to freedom suits in 
the District of Columbia.”). 
34  See id. at 62–63; Jamie Stiehm, ‘The Star-Spangled Banner’s’ Racist Lyrics Reflect Its Slave Owner 
Author, Francis Scott Key, The Undefeated (Sept. 6, 2018), https://theundefeated.com/features
/the-star-spangled-banners-racist-lyrics-reflect-its-slaveowner-author-francis-scott-key/ [https:
//perma.cc/PE5W-XLND] (“Lawyer-poet Key, born to massive slaveholding wealth in Maryland, 
was one of the richest men in America.  He liked it that way.  As he grew older and darker, Key 
sought to buttress slavery, known as our own ‘peculiar institution.’  He did just that, past his last 
breath.  The U.S. Supreme Court, which he helped shape, stood strongly for slavery.  So beside the 
anthem, his political legacy as a critical political player in upholding slavery is devastating.”); see 
also Christopher Wilson, Where’s the Debate on Francis Scott Key’s Slave-Holding Legacy, Smithsonian 
Mag. (July 1, 2016), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smithsonian-institution/wheres-debate-
francis-scott-keys-slave-holding-legacy-180959550/ [https://perma.cc/YGT5-DLL3] (“Additionally, 
Key used his office as the District Attorney for the City of Washington from 1833 to 1840 to defend 
slavery, attacking the abolitionist movement in several high-profile cases.”). 
35  See Finkelman, supra note 18, at 56–57. 
36  See Daina Ramey Berry, The Price for Their Pound of Flesh 9 (2017) (“My hope is that 
the enslaved ‘body would not be disposed of like a dead animal but the book be closed with some 
dignity and solemnity.’”); see also Martha Minow, Forgiveness, Law and Justice, 103 Calif. L. Rev. 1615, 
1630 (2015) (“We may try to promote forms of forgiveness because of the difficulty in doing 
anything else.”); cf. Ariela J. Gross, Litigating Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determination in the 
Nineteenth-Century South, 108 Yale L.J. 109, 121 (1998) (emphasizing the difficulties of such trials 
for humans living at the time); Timothy Snyder, Black Earth: The Holocaust as History and 
Warning xiv–xv (2015) (“We recall the victims, but are apt to confuse commemoration with 
understanding. . . . This is not only a matter of justice, but of understanding.”). 
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through his uneven jurisprudence when presented with opportunities to promote 
freedom and limit the legal status of chattel slavery.37  
In the review that follows, Part I sets the stage for an examination of both books 
by articulating some general principles about the importance of truth to historical 
writing about the law.  The importance of a truthful accounting of United States 
history in 2018 has particular merit to the law given the ascendancy of “originalism” 
as an interpretative concept at the highest levels of the judiciary.38  Parts II and III 
then address the historical claims made by Professors Paul and Finkelman, and  they 
examine each book from this perspective and with reference to what each book 
teaches about the other and about its subject. 
The difference between the two books—indeed, the difference between 
Finkelman’s account and virtually all prior biographical efforts—appears to be one 
involving historical curiosity and basic forensic skill.  Finkelman’s book displays 
both qualities.  Paul’s displays neither.  A worthy recitation of American historical 
biography would further our understanding of Marshall by engaging the most 
                                                                    
37  For a thorough analysis of this position, see infra Parts I–III. 
38  Regarding the connection between “originalism” and “good history,” see Gordon S. Wood, 
No Thanks for the Memories, N.Y. Rev. Books (Jan. 13, 2011), https://www.nybooks.com
/articles/2011/01/13/no-thanks-memories/ [https://perma.cc/BC3K-TZ86] (reviewing Jill Lepore, 
The Whites of Their Eyes: The Tea Party's Revolution and the Battle Over American 
History (2010)).  Per Wood:  
 Originalism may not be good history, but it is a philosophy of legal and constitutional interpretation 
that has engaged some of the best minds in the country’s law schools over the past three decades or so.  It 
is basic to the mission of the Federalist Society (an important organization of conservative and libertarian 
jurists, lawyers, law professors, and students), and at times it may have as many as four adherents on the 
Supreme Court.  Justice Antonin Scalia’s book A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law (1997), 
which staked out an originalist position on statutory interpretation, was taken seriously enough to 
generate critical responses from Ronald Dworkin, Lawrence [sic] H. Tribe, Mary Ann Glendon, and 
myself, all published in Scalia’s book along with his replies.  In other words, originalism, controversial as 
it may be, is a significant enough doctrine of judicial interpretation that even its most passionate 
opponents would not write it off as cavalierly as Lepore does in this book. 
Id.  Regarding the connection between the fundamental character for truth-telling and the United 
States Supreme Court, see Matt Thompson, This Was Never About Finding Out the Truth, The 
Atlantic (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/09/kavanaugh-ford-
hearing-was-never-about-truth/571729/ [https://perma.cc/885F-2GZQ], as the extreme and 
troubling confirmation hearing for our most recent nominee to the United States Supreme Court 
highlighted the importance of taking up the cause of truth in a writing on judicial archetypes.  As 
Thompson writes, “[h]ow, against this backdrop, can the fiction persist that this spectacle has 
been in pursuit of truth?” Id.; see also Nathan J. Robinson, How We Know Kavanaugh is Lying, 
Current Affairs (Sept. 29, 2018), https://www.currentaffairs.org/2018/09/how-we-know-
kavanaugh-is-lying [https://perma.cc/6ZKT-CMAY]. 
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compelling sources of historical study.39  We—the American “We”—are a legal 
culture that gives credence and authority to great decisions by great judicial figures.  
Marshall and his opinions are given tremendous weight, even today, in decisions 
that come before contemporary courts two hundred years after he was appointed 
Chief Justice.40 
This is no less true today, where our nation’s highest judicial officers have 
expressed their deep interest in history and the study of history.41  The uses of 
history have been a source of substantial discussion among judicial officers, 
including our most recent nominee to the United States Supreme Court.42  Accuracy 
in assessing the historical standing and perspective of judicial officers thus has 
great instrumental value.43  To the extent our assessment causes us to devalue 
                                                                    
39  See generally Martha Howell & Walter Prevenier, From Reliable Sources: An 
Introduction to Historical Methods (2001). 
40  See, e.g., South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2090 (2018); Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 
1843, 1874 (2017) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2794 
(2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 532–4 (2012). 
41  See generally Eric Foner, Donald Trump’s Unconstitutional Dreams, N.Y. Times (Oct. 31, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/31/opinion/donald-trumps-birthright-citizenship.html?
action=click&module=Opinion&pgtype=Homepage [https://perma.cc/384S-GF89] (discussing 
United States history in response to constitutional questions regarding the power of the President 
to restrict the definition of citizenship); Harvard Law School, HLS in the World/A Conversation with 
Six Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, YouTube (Oct. 27, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=_EeU6Lo_i7I&t=4094s [https://perma.cc/TW2B-S4LX] (00:01:13) (capturing Chief 
Justice Roberts directly referencing Marshall’s most significant biographer). 
42  See generally Amanda L. Tyler et al., A Dialogue with Federal Judges on the Role of History in 
Interpretation, 80 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1889 (2012) (including then-Judge Brett Kavanaugh). 
43  See Norman W. Spaulding, Constitution as Countermonument: Federalism, Reconstruction, and the 
Problem of Collective Memory, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1992, 1999 (2003) (“For all their formal insulation 
from the demands of popular consciousness, it is primarily the courts that bear the explicit 
institutional burden of collective memory.”); see also Robert W. Gordon, The Arrival of Critical 
Historicism, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 1023, 1023 (1997) (“After all, lawyers have recognized history for 
centuries and put it to work in argument, justification and rationalization. . . . History is not only 
a source of authority but of legitimacy: [i]t reassures us that what we do now flows continuously 
out of our past, out of precedents, traditions, fidelity to statutory and Constitutional texts and 
meanings.”); Ariela Gross, When is the Time of Slavery? The History of Slavery in Contemporary Legal 
and Political Argument, 96 Calif. L. Rev. 283, 286 (2008) (“Legal and political actors tell and re-tell 
these histories because they seek to persuade audiences of the moral force of their claims. . . . The 
way we tell the story of slavery and freedom matters to the arguments we make, and those 
arguments shape the histories we tell.”).  On perspectives regarding the effect of reputations of 
jurists on the law and how jurists’ own perspectives can impact the significance of a court and its 
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perspectives of the past we think out of step with our sense of justice, that 
assessment may determine the path of the law in the present and the future.44 
Biographies like those written by Professor Paul entrench mythology even as 
they purport to convey a more complete truth about the men they mythologize.45  
This approach continues a tradition of deep distortion regarding American history 
and race that is inherently pernicious and has had devastating consequences for the 
country and for racial minorities in particular.46  More generally, if increasing 
                                                                    
decisions, see Nuno Garoupa & Tom Ginsburg, Judicial Reputation: A Comparative Theory 
2 (2015), arguing: 
 Reputation is crucial to any endeavor, but it is particularly important for courts, which famously 
lack the purse or the sword.  Armed only with pens, judges can only be effective if they are persuasive and 
authoritative to the parties before them, the legal community, and the public as a whole.  To be 
authoritative requires, at bottom, a reputation for good decision making. . . . [Courts] are constrained by 
what is possible and by the preferences of others whose action . . . is required to effectuate judicial 
decisions. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
44   See Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings 5 (1996) (“Precisely because the Constitution has 
always played a central role in American politics, law, and political culture, as both a continuing 
source of dispute and a legitimating symbol of national values, the interpretation of its historical 
origins and meaning has rarely if ever been divorced from an awareness of contemporary 
ramifications.”); see also John W. Ely, Jr., The Marshall Court and Property Rights: A Reappraisal, 33 J. 
Marshall L. Rev. 1023, 1023 (2000) (“Historians have long stressed the affinity between the 
jurisprudence of John Marshall and the protection of property rights.”); Amy Kapczynski, 
Historicism, Progress, and the Redemptive Constitution, 26 Cardozo L. Rev. 1041, 1045 (2005) 
(“Redemptive constitutionalism is occupied with the time of the present . . . . Its privileged locus 
of constitutional agency and authority is the present.  It adopts a critical stance toward history, 
seeking to uncover discontinuities within historical narratives.  Redemptive narratives use 
history not firmly to bound constitutional interpretation, but openly to rewrite history, and insist 
upon the continual need to do so.”); Jack N. Rakove, The Origins of Judicial Review: A Plea for New 
Contexts, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 1031, 1031 (1997) (“This form of critical history appeals to those who seek 
to rescue lost voices of the past from the hegemonic claims of the victors whose triumphs the 
discipline of history has often served and promoted.”).  
45  See Wythe Holt, Review of Books, 55 Wm. & Mary Q. 663, 664 (1998) (reviewing Charles F. 
Hobson, The Great Chief Justice: John Marshall and the Rule of Law (1996), Herbert A. 
Johnson, The Chief Justiceship of John Marshall, 1801–1835 (1997), & Jean Edward Smith, 
John Marshall: Definer of a Nation (1996))  (“Hagiography, however, is for the lives of saints.  
Chief Justice Marshall deserves to be treated critically.  Fortunately, there is sufficient material in 
these volumes to provide critical perspective, even if the authors do not often use it.”). 
46  See, e.g., Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: The “Objectivity Question” and the 
American Historical Profession 77–80 (22d prtg. 2005) (1988) (describing the complicity of 
professional historians in historical interpretation of American slavery which was “harshly critical 
of the abolitionists” as “irresponsible agitators” while accepting “a considerably softened picture 
of slavery”). 
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notions of understanding are a justification for more history, Paul’s biography 
would not meet the test.  As it relates to the law—to the extent legal practitioners 
rely upon history when resolving current matters—Paul’s approach to history is 
bound to lead to distortions and bad results.47   
Indeed, even if we are duty-bound to honor the founding generation for 
establishing the constitutional and philosophical foundations of our country and 
the liberties they confer,48 we must acknowledge and not minimize how they also 
transgressed great moral principles, victimizing millions of men, women, and 
children, all while promoting principles of political humanism unique to the 
world.49   
Consider that Chief Justice Marshall, reflecting on the American Revolution, 
                                                                    
47  See Robert W. Gordon, The Struggle Over the Past, 44 Clev. St. L. Rev. 123, 124 (1996) (describing 
how debates over the history of law drive approaches to the resolution of contemporaneous legal 
problems); see also Gordon, supra note 43, at 1023 (“After all, lawyers have recognized history for 
centuries and put it to work in argument, justification, and rationalization.  Most of the ways in 
which lawyers use history are, however, not ‘critical’ in any plausible sense of the term.  For lawyers 
the past is primarily a source of authority—if we interpret it correctly, it will tell us how to conduct 
ourselves now.”).  Attorneys with less time to survey American history critically will accept as true 
what they read and perpetuate mythology, innocently, through the generations.  See Joseph 
Mattson, More than an Umpire: Book Examines Chief Justice John Marshall’s Legacy, 29 N.H. B. News 8 
(Dec. 19, 2018), at 8 (recommending Paul’s biography as a means of obtaining a greater 
understanding of Marshall and the judiciary, and thereby serving as an example of how 
discussions within the bar can perpetuate perspectives that may have a widespread effect on the 
law). 
48  Not all great American judicial figures accepted this assessment.  See Michael Long, Let’s Let 
Thurgood Marshall Explain What’s Wrong with Brett Kavanaugh’s Originalism, L.A. Times (Sept. 2, 
2018, 4:05 AM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-long-thurgood-marshall-
originalism-supreme-court-20180902-story.html [https://perma.cc/4V87-F35D].  In his article, 
Long quotes Marshall as saying, “I do not believe that the meaning of the Constitution was forever 
‘fixed’ at the Philadelphia Convention . . . . Nor do I find the wisdom, foresight, and sense of justice 
exhibited by the Framers particularly profound.”  Id. 
49  See Jill Lepore, These Truths: A History of the United States 99 (2018) (“The 
Declaration that Congress did adopt was a stunning rhetorical feat, an act of extraordinary 
political courage.  It also marked a colossal failure of political will, in holding back the tide of 
opposition to slavery by ignoring it, for the sake of a union that, in the end, could not and would 
not last.”); see also, e.g., Joseph J. Ellis, American Dialogue: The Founders and Us 14 (2018) 
(“This is the place to begin, not end, our investigation of the Jefferson legacy, namely with the 
realization that our most eloquent ‘apostle of freedom’ is also our most dedicated racist, and that 
in his mind those two convictions were inseparable.”); Fred Kaplan, Lincoln and the 
Abolitionists 1–11 (2017) (describing the reaction of President John Quincy Adams to the story 
of Dorcas Allen, who killed two of her children rather than permit them to be sold, with her, into 
slavery). 
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wrote: 
Our resistance was not made to actual oppression.  Americans were not pressed down 
to the earth by the weight of their chains nor goaded to resistance by actual suffering. . 
. . The war was a war of principle against a system hostile to political liberty, from which 
oppression was to be dreaded, not against actual oppression.50 
Finkelman has proven that Marshall, as a slaveowner and tradesman in the 
market of human slavery, knew the other sort of oppression and knew that it was 
wrong.  How could he not?  The great injustice of slavery was apparent to leading 
western philosophers thousands of years before Marshall’s birth.51  In any case, 
Marshall’s own statements deprive him and his contemporaries of a defense on the 
grounds of factual or moral ignorance.52 
When viewed in light of Finkelman’s assessment of his slavery jurisprudence 
and his deep personal stake in the institution of slavery,53 Marshall’s perceived 
heroism in the American Revolution is diminished.  So are his accomplishments as 
a national and international stateman.  In the end, Chief Justice Marshall and his 
contemporaries were simply unable to exert the moral strength to overcome the 
greatest moral travesty of their time.54  Finkelman demonstrates that when 
                                                                    
50  Newmyer, supra note 8, at 1 (alteration in original) (quoting Letter from John Marshall to 
Edward Everette, (Aug. 2, 1826)). 
51  See Plato, supra note 1, at 298 (“Thus, for example, if some men were causes of the death of 
many, either by betraying cities or armies and had reduced men to slavery, or were involved in 
any other wrongdoing, they received for each of these things tenfold sufferings; and again, if they 
had done good deeds and had proved just and holy, in the same measure did they receive 
reward.”). 
52  See generally Gideon Rosen, Culpability and Ignorance, 103 Proc. Aristotelian Soc’y 61, 61 
(2003) (describing the defenses of factual and moral culpability and defending an expansive view 
of the factors that would exculpate otherwise blameworthy conduct viewed in hindsight). 
53  See Finkelman, supra note 18, at 29 (“Marshall’s early life, his pre-Court career, his fierce 
nationalism, his personal investment in and relationship to human bondage in his private life, 
and his nonjudicial public life help us understand his slavery jurisprudence.”); see also id. at 37 (“In 
1830 he owned more than 125 slaves in Henrico and Fauquier Counties, in addition to more than 
a dozen slaves in Richmond.  His holdings would have been well over two hundred slaves by this 
time, had he not given about seventy to his sons . . . between about 1819 and 1830.”); id. at 38 (“As 
he had in 1784, on July 4, 1787, Marshall spent Independence Day buying slaves . . . .”); id. at 40 
(“Marshall’s account books and the Richmond property records, incomplete as they are, illustrate 
that Marshall owned a substantial and growing number of slaves and that he was deeply engaged 
in the economic activities of slavery.”).  
54  See Richard Kluger, Simple Justice xi (2004) (“If it is a sin to aspire to conduct of a higher 
order than one may at the moment be capable of, then Americans surely sinned in professing that 
all men are created equal—and then acting otherwise.”); see also Finkelman, Slavery and the 
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presented with the opportunity and the ability to relieve some injustice caused by 
slavery in individual cases, Chief Justice Marshall’s moral compass led him instead 
to undermine the cause of freedom, where “[s]lavery as practiced in the American 
South, it is now generally acknowledged, was probably as severe as any form of it in 
recorded history.”55 
This Review seeks to place both biographies into the context of an ever-
accelerating destabilization of the traditional historical assessment of American 
history in the first generation of our constitutional government.56  In this light, 
Professor Finkelman’s contemporaneous account reveals that Professor Paul’s 
biography continues the problematic tradition of recounting our history and 
evaluating our framers without acknowledging their greatest failures, especially 
where those failures continue to haunt us.57  That tradition has infected the history 
of this country from its founding moments.58  Professor Paul’s failure to account 
fully and accurately for Marshall’s participation in slavery is inexplicable because so 
many sources of relevant information were available, and the justifications for 
avoiding the truth about American history remain as weak as they have ever been.59    
                                                                    
Founders, supra note 25, at 247.  In a chapter entitled “Thomas Jefferson, Sally Hemings, and 
Antislavery: Historians and Myths,” Finkelman explains:  
We consider Jefferson a great man, a leader, an icon.  He is praised for his vision; there is nothing ordinary 
about him.  Therefore, it seems reasonable to expect that Jefferson’s position on slavery and race should 
have been at the cutting edge of the late eighteenth century and not somewhere in the middle or at the 
back of the pack. 
Id. at 237, 247. 
55  See Kluger, supra note 54, at 26. 
56  See, e.g., Martha Jones, Birthright Citizens: A History of Race and Rights in 
Antebellum America (2018) (describing the legal history of minorities in antebellum America as 
they sought legal definition as free American citizens). 
57  See Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism ix (1976) (“We can no longer afford 
to take that which was good in the past and simply call it our heritage, to discard the bad and 
simply think of it as a dead load which by itself time will bury in oblivion.”). 
58  See W.E.B. DuBois, Black Reconstruction in America 1860–1880 4 (2d. ed. 1998) (“So long 
as slavery was a matter of race and color, it made the conscience of the nation uneasy and 
continually affronted its ideals.  The men who wrote the Constitution sought by every evasion, 
and almost by subterfuge, to keep recognition of slavery out of the basic form of the new 
government.”). 
59  See, e.g., Paul John Eakin, Introduction: Mapping the Ethics of Life Writing, in The Ethics of Life 
Writing 2 (2004) (“Like Lauritzen, the biographer Dianne Middlebrook holds that when a writer 
addresses biographical or historical fact, telling the truth is essential.”); Jerome Manis, What 
Should Biographers Tell? The Ethics of Telling Lives, 17 Biography 386, 387 (1994) (“Still it is becoming 
increasingly evident that some widely publicized and highly profitable biographies are based on 
dubious information and purposes.”); see also Marc Bloch, The Historian’s Craft 6 (1953) 
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This Review concludes that Professor Paul provides an account of Chief Justice 
Marshall that is consistent with a standard, deeply incomplete, and indeed, error-
filled narrative about him.  Those substantial errors are exposed by another book, 
Supreme Injustice, by Professor Finkelman, which reveals in groundbreaking fashion 
Chief Justice Marshall’s deep personal and professional commitment to and 
investment in the institution of American slavery.  That commitment to an 
institution that has been rejected by our law and by pervasive social norms should 
give his modern successors, attorneys, judges, students of the law, and citizens as 
well a greater level of pause in relying upon Chief Justice Marshall as a posthumous 
authority and reference point in debates regarding contemporary legal subjects. 
I .  US I NG T R UT H AS  T HE  ME AS UR E  OF  O UR  HI S T O RI C AL  MONUME N T S 
Hordes of attorneys, judges, and academics would, if called upon, offer 
defenses of Chief Justice Marshall and argue that this Book Review and other critical 
assessments have engaged in an improper and unfairly critical exercise.  Perhaps 
the same group would defend Professor Paul and other Marshall biographers on the 
ground that their assessments of Chief Justice Marshall rightly focus on issues of 
greater importance to Marshall and his contemporaries.  Professor Gordon S. 
Wood, for instance, posits: 
To be able to see the participants of the past in this comprehensive way, to see them 
in the context of their own time, to describe their blindness and folly with sympathy, to 
recognize the extent to which they were caught up in changing circumstances over 
which they had little control, and to realize the degree to which they created results they 
never intended—to know all this about the past and to be able to relate it without 
anachronistic distortion to our present is what is meant by having a historical sense.60 
                                                                    
(writing of the uses of history and asking whether history has “betrayed us” in the years 
surrounding the German occupation of France). 
60  Gordon S. Wood, The Purpose of the Past: Reflections on The Uses of History 11 
(2008); see also Fyodor Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov 244 (Richard Pevear & Larisa 
Volokhonsky trans., 2002) (“Oh, with my pathetic, earthly, Euclidean mind, I know only that there 
is suffering, that none are to blame, that all things follow simply and directly one from another, 
that everything flows and finds its level—but that is all just Euclidean gibberish, of course I know 
that, and of course I cannot consent to live by it!”); J.G.A. Pocock, The Ancient Constitution 
and the Feudal Law 4 (1987) (“At this point, however, we encounter what is at once the paradox 
and the true importance of the humanist movement, viewed from the standpoint of the history of 
historiography; for it is not too much to say that in making these claims and demands the 
humanists were calling for a return to the ancient world ‘as it really was’ . . . . And the paradox . . . 
was this: the humanists aimed at resurrecting the ancient world in order to copy and imitate it, 
but the more thoroughly and accurately the process of resurrection was carried out, the more 
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This standard, properly understood, even as it would encourage sympathy with 
respect to the most egregious violence in the country’s past, would still require a 
comprehensive understanding of history and would not justify historical half-
truths or historical denial.61  It certainly would not prevent a person with historical 
sense—or one hoping to achieve it—from engaging in a normative assessment of 
history despite imposing a presumption of sympathy for those who are the subjects 
of such assessment.62 
Moreover, the human need for comprehensive truth as a foundation for justice 
is as powerful an expression of the human personality as the desire to suppress 
truth to work injustice.63  Survivors of the highly documented genocides of the 
twentieth century—specifically the Holocaust, perpetrated by a reputedly 
developed nation upon millions of largely defenseless human beings and resulting 
                                                                    
evident it became that copying and imitation were impossible—or could never be anything more 
than copying and imitation.”). 
61  See Lepore, supra note 49, at xvi (“I wrote this book because writing an American history from 
beginning to end and across that divide hasn’t been attempted in a long time . . . . One reason it’s 
important is that understanding history as a form of inquiry—not something easy or comforting 
but as something demanding and exhausting—was central to the nation’s founding.”). 
62  See id. at xvii (“In the new history books, historians aimed to solve mysteries and to discover 
their own truths.  The turn from reference to inquiry, from mystery to history, was crucial to the 
founding of the United States.  It didn’t require abdicating faith in the truths of revealed 
religion[,] and it relieved no one of the obligation to judge right from wrong.  But it did require 
subjecting the past to skepticism, to look to beginnings not to justify ends, but to question them—
with evidence.”). 
63  Within days of his death, a monumental figure of no lesser standing than President Ulysses 
S. Grant pled, in regard to his role as the commanding officer in for the United States Army in the 
Civil War: “I would not have the anniversaries of our victories celebrated, nor those of our defeats 
made fast days and spent in humiliation and prayer; but I would like to see truthful history 
written.”  Ulysses S. Grant, Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant 90 (1999).  On the other hand, of 
course, there is also quite a bit of evidence that humans are either not interested in truth or easily 
distracted in the quest for truth.  See Jennifer Kavanaugh & Michael D. Rich, Truth Decay: 
An Initial Exploration of the Diminishing Role of Facts and Analysis in American 
Public Life iii (2018), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports
/RR2300/RR2314/RAND_RR2314.pdf [https://perma.cc/2DKD-EBU6] (last visited Feb. 12, 2019) 
(studying the rejection of truth in American public life); see also Allan Bloom, The Closing of 
the American Mind 25 (2012) (“There is one thing a professor can be absolutely certain of: almost 
every student entering the university believes or says he believes, that truth is relative.”); Maria 
Konnikova, Trump’s Lies vs. Your Brain, Politico (Jan/Feb 2017), https://www.politico.com
/magazine/story/2017/01/donald-trump-lies-liar-effect-brain-214658 [https://perma.cc/QJ56-
JEUY] (“When we are overwhelmed with false, or potentially false, statements, our brains pretty 
quickly become so overworked that we stop trying to sift through everything.”). 
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in the near eradication of Eastern European Jews—present powerful examples of 
this phenomenon.  These survivors have vocalized a strong desire to protect the 
truth about their suffering and to combat efforts to deny or minimize it.64  As a 
matter of human development and education, it would be difficult to imagine a 
credible, justifiable, or prudent philosophy that trafficked in the denial or 
minimization of human atrocity, at least from the standpoint of an average 
twentieth or twenty-first century liberal democrat.65  In the aftermath of the 
Holocaust, this sensibility has led to the reexamination of American history through 
a lens that rejects double standards regarding our own blameworthy history.66  
Perhaps as a result of this desire for truth, bald-faced lying and distortions—
particularly about American history—are more easily challenged and unmasked, 
                                                                    
64  See, e.g., Ariel Burger, Witness: Lessons from Elie Wiesel’s Classroom 21–22 (2018) 
(“Wiesel frequently pointed to the Jewish victims of the Holocaust who, hiding in bunkers from 
the Nazis, scratched their names into the walls and wrote invisible messages in urine, who buried 
manuscripts in tin cans under the ghetto streets so that one day their names, their words, their 
lives might be remembered.  He believed that those who lived before us call to us to remember 
them and that by examining the past, we can create a new future.”); see also Deborah Lipstadt, 
The Eichmann Trial xxiii (2011) (“When survivors heard of my coming legal battle, they sent me 
notes, letters, and copies of their books.  All came with a similar message: ‘[t]his is my story.  This 
is what happened to me and to my family.  This is what David Irving and his cohorts wish to deny.  
This is the history you must protect.  You must stand up for us.’”).  See generally Deborah Lipstadt, 
Denying the Holocaust: The Growing Assault on Truth and Memory 8 (1994).  Works of 
striking literary importance have been published for the purpose of ensuring that humanity never 
forget the atrocities visited upon it.  See, e.g., Charles Reznikoff, Holocaust (3d prtg. 2017) 
(1975) (“All that follows is based on a United States government publication, Trials of War 
Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals, and the records of the Eichmann trial in 
Jerusalem.”). 
65  See generally John Dewey, Democracy and Education (1916) (outlining the relationship 
between human development and education, including an accounting of the need for greater 
sophistication in formal education as human society becomes more complex); Bloch, supra note 
59, at 81 (“True progress began on the day when . . . doubt became an ‘examiner’; or, in other words, 
when there had gradually been worked out objective rules which permitted the separation of truth 
from falsehood.”).  But see Yuval Noah Harari, Sapiens 25 (2015) (“How did Homo Sapiens manage 
to cross this critical threshold, eventually founding cities comprising tens of thousands of 
inhabitants and empires ruling hundreds of millions?  The secret was probably the appearance of 
fiction.  Large numbers of strangers can cooperate successfully by believing in common myths.”).  
66  See Douglas Blackmun, Slavery by Another Name 3 (2008) (“I was a reporter for the Wall 
Street Journal, exploring the possibility of a story asking a provocative question: [w]hat would be 
revealed if American corporations were examined through the same sharp lens of historical 
confrontation as the one then being trained on German corporations that relied on Jewish slave 
labor during World War II and the Swiss banks that robbed victims of the Holocaust of their 
fortunes?”). 
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especially by prominent figures assessing the history of their homelands.67 
Consider the remarkable speech recently given by the mayor of New Orleans, 
Mitch Landrieu.  On May 24, 2017, this politician of the American South stood at a 
lectern and explained to a national audience why he was removing statues 
dedicated to two confederate generals and the President of the Confederate States 
of America.  His explanation was conciliatory and infused with rich historical 
accuracy long rare in the region.68  It was also unsparing in its description of racial 
                                                                    
67   See, e.g., Eric Foner, Reconstruction xvii (1988).  Foner writes:  
The interpretation elaborated by the Dunning School may be briefly summarized as follows.  When the 
Civil War ended, the white South genuinely accepted the reality of military defeat, stood ready to do 
justice to the emancipated slaves, and desired above all a quick integration into the fabric of national life.  
Before his death, Abraham Lincoln had embarked on a course of sectional reconciliation, and during 
Presidential Reconstruction (1865–67) his successor, Andrew Johnson, attempted to carry out Lincoln’s 
magnanimous polices.  Johnson’s efforts were opposed and eventually thwarted by Radical Republicans 
in Congress.  Motivated by an irrational hatred of Southern “rebels” and the desire to consolidate their 
party’s national ascendancy, the Radicals in 1867 swept aside the Southern governments Johnson had 
established and fastened black suffrage upon the defeated South. 
Id.; see also Colin G. Calloway, The Indian World of George Washington 14 (2018) 
(“Ignoring or excluding Native Americans from Washington’s life, like excluding it from the early 
history of the nation, contributes to the erasure of Indians from America’s past and America’s 
memory.  It also diminishes our understanding of Washington and his world.”); Nicholas 
Lemann, Redemption The Last Battle of the Civil War xi (2006) (“In the Southern states with 
the largest black populations, the tradition of white vigilantism, which had persevered among 
Confederate veterans despite, or perhaps because of their defeat at Appomattox, began to evolve 
into an organized, if unofficial, military effort to take away by terrorist violence the black political 
rights that were now part of the Constitution.”); Lou Falkner Williams, The Great Ku Klux 
Klan Trials  1871–1872 28–29 (1996) (“Sweeping through the countryside late at night, masked 
riders burst into the homes of Republicans, dragged hundreds of them from their beds, and 
whipped them severely.  Driven from their homes, large numbers of freedmen spent the night 
hours in the woods and swamps.  If whippings were the most frequent manifestation of Klan 
violence, they were hardly the most atrocious.  Robbery, rape, arson, and even murder were 
common.”); David W. Blight, The Silent Type, N.Y. Rev. Books (May 24, 2018), 
https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2018/05/24/ulysses-grant-silent-type/ [https://perma.cc
/Z5LH-NHUA] (concluding that President Grant’s efforts at Reconstruction were “defeated by the 
unrelenting violence in Southern politics during Reconstruction, and by the overwhelming 
challenge of the depression of 1873.”); cf. Allen Nevins, Hamilton Fish: The Inner History of 
the Grant Administration 591 (1936) (quoting Secretary of State Hamilton Fish about Attorney 
General Amos Akerman) (“He has it on the brain.  He tells a number of stories, one of a fellow 
being castrated, with terribly minute and tedious details of each case.  It has got to be a bore to 
listen twice a week to this thing.”). 
68  See Mitch Landrieu’s Speech on the Removal of Conservative Monuments in New Orleans, N.Y. Times 
(May 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/23/opinion/mitch-landrieus-speech-
transcript.html [https://perma.cc/NPA9-KXTS] [hereinafter Landrieu’s Speech] (“The soul of our 
beloved City is deeply rooted in a history that has evolved over thousands of years; rooted in a 
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violence in New Orleans and of the deeply distorted and continually distorting 
effects of the conspiracy to hide or cover up the city’s violent, racist history.  Mayor 
Landrieu said: 
[T]here are also other truths about our city that we must confront.  New Orleans was 
America’s largest slave market: a port where hundreds of thousands of souls were 
bought, sold and shipped up the Mississippi River to lives of forced labor of misery of 
rape, of torture.  America was the place where nearly 4000 of our fellow citizens were 
lynched, 540 alone in Louisiana; where courts enshrined ‘separate but equal’; where 
Freedom riders coming to New Orleans were beaten to a bloody pulp.  So when people 
say to me that the monuments in question are history, well what I just described is real 
history as well, and it is the searing truth.69 
When addressing the claim that the monuments to white supremacy in the South 
must be maintained for history’s sake, Landrieu responded: 
[I]t immediately begs the questions, why there are no slave ship monuments, no 
prominent markers on public land to remember the lynchings or the slave blocks; 
nothing to remember this long chapter of our lives; the pain, the sacrifice, the shame . . 
. . So for those self-appointed defenders of history and the monuments, they are eerily 
silent on what amounts to this historical malfeasance, a lie by omission.  There is a 
difference between remembrance of history and reverence of it.70 
In a book he wrote expanding upon the subjects he addressed in his speech, 
Mayor Landrieu equates his unwillingness to deny the history of racism in New 
                                                                    
diverse people who have been here together every step of the way—for both good and for ill.  It is 
a history that holds in its heart the stories of Native Americans – the Choctaw, Houma Nation, the 
Chitimacha.  Of Hernando De Soto, Robert Cavelier, Sieur de La Salle, the Acadians, the Islenos, 
the enslaved people from Senegambia, Free People of Colorix, the Haitians, the Germans, both 
the empires of France and Spain.  The Italians, the Irish, the Cubans, the south and central 
Americans, the Vietnamese and so many more.”). 
69  Id.  Of course, Mayor Landrieu could be subject to the critique that he is engaging in 
“presentism”—the negative assessment of historical figures from the reference point of current 
norms, without balance.  Professor Gordon Wood has leveled this critique at recent scholars who 
sought to bring attention to connection between our constitution, the founders, and human 
slavery.  Gordon S. Wood, Reading the Founders’ Minds, N.Y. Rev. Books (June 28, 2007), 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2007/06/28/reading-the-founders-minds/ [https://perma.cc
/57DS-8Q9T].  In his piece, he calls for “balance,” notwithstanding the tomes of history he has 
published throughout his career minimizing the role of slavery during the founding era in 
remarkably defensive terms.  See id. (“Now we have these additional two books under review to 
help satisfy the seemingly insatiable desire of many historians today to place slavery at the heart 
of America’s origins.”). 
70  Landrieu’s Speech, supra note 68. 
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Orleans with his experience visiting landmarks of the Holocaust.71  The parallel 
experiences of the United States and Nazi Germany, and the extent to which Nazi 
Germany drew on American examples of racist law, render Landrieu’s visits to Nazi 
concentration camps an apt comparison for an American of the South confronting 
racism in its most destructive form.72  Thus, it is not surprising that in the book 
chronicling his efforts to remove monuments to slavery, treasonous white 
supremacy, and terrorism in his city, the phrase “Never Again” reverberates as a 
buttress against complacency.73  It is not surprising because that phrase has come 
to represent the refusal to forget history as an important component of recovering 
from it.74 
                                                                    
71  Mitch Landrieu, In the Shadow of Statues: A White Southerner Confronts 
History 48–49 (2018).  Landrieu recalls:  
I was barely twenty when I visited Auschwitz.  I clearly remember the suitcases stacked high bearing the 
names of people gassed to death, men and women and children who never knew their meager belongings 
would one day signify their lives.  The mounds of hair, hairbrushes, false teeth, prosthetics, the stacks of 
eyeglasses, they carried a moral weight heavier than anything I had ever felt.  To read about the Holocaust 
from afar is to get a grasp of history and that unspeakable horror.  It also allows denial to creep in—That 
was then, this is now.  It is not us.  This can never happen in the United States. . . .  
 . . . . 
 And then the realization came that we had done something like this in America with slavery.  The 
systematic evil of Nazism was the closest thing to the Southern society that relied on slave labor.  I was 
torn by the connection between these two realities of history, different in time and place, but with a 
common root, a warped sense that some people are superior to others, a supremacy trapped in a frozen 
heart. 
Id. 
72  James Q. Whitman, Hitler’s American Model: The United States and the Making of 
Nazi Race Law 2 (2017) (“In the late 1920s and early 1930s many Nazis, including not least Hitler 
himself, took a serious interest in the racist legislation of the United States.  Indeed, in Mein 
Kampf, Hitler praised America as nothing less than ‘the one state’ that had made progress toward 
the creation of a healthy racist order of the kind the Nuremberg Laws were intended to 
establish.”); see also Alex Ross, The Hitler Vortex, New Yorker, Apr. 30, 2018, at 71 (“The Nazis were 
not wrong to cite American precedents.  Enslavement of African-Americans was written into the 
U.S. Constitution.  Thomas Jefferson spoke of the need to ‘eliminate’ or ‘extirpate’ Native 
Americans. . . . General Philip Sheridan spoke of ‘annihilation, obliteration, and complete 
destruction.’”). 
73  Cf. Spaulding, supra note 43, at 2000 (“Chattel slavery and segregation are historical injustices 
of a magnitude not unlike the crimes responsible for the problem of memory Germany now 
confronts.”). 
74  See, e.g., Snyder, supra note 36, at xv (“Part of the effort to understand the past is thus the 
effort needed to understand ourselves.  The Holocaust is not only history, but warning.”); see also 
Richard Evans, From Nazism to Never Again, Foreign Affairs (Jan./Feb. 2018), 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/western-europe/2017-12-12/nazism-never-again [https:
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In the context of discussing the Holocaust, the denial of history has been 
confronted by powerful, normative responses that are both deontological and 
consequentialist in nature.75  That is, the responses address alternatives to 
truthtelling as a matter of justice with and without reference to the costs and 
benefits of the outcomes.76  As an example, Justice Antonin Scalia remarked: 
It is the purpose of these annual Holocaust remembrances—as it is the purpose of 
the nearby Holocaust museum—not only to honor the memory of the six million Jews 
and three or four million other poor souls caught up in this 20th-century terror, but also, 
by keeping the memory of their tragedy painfully alive, to prevent its happening again.  
The latter can be achieved only by acknowledging, and passing on to our children, the 
existence of absolute, uncompromisable standards of human conduct.  Mankind has 
traditionally derived such standards from religion; and the West has derived them from 
and through the Jews.  Those absolute and uncompromisable standards of human 
conduct will not endure without an effort to make them endure, and it is to that 
enterprise that we rededicate ourselves today.77 
These same “uncompromisable” standards of human conduct apply across 
national borders and even across time periods.  A consistent application of these 
standards would require an application to the millions-upon-millions of men, 
women, and children who lived under the yoke of human slavery in the United 
States prior to the Civil War.78  After all, it was the very institution of slavery itself 
                                                                    
//perma.cc/QG9C-S7RB] (“When it comes to accepting the sins of the past, there is, in the end, no 
alternative for Germany.”). 
75  See, e.g., Tony Judt, Postwar 103 (2005) (“To deny or belittle the Shoah—the Holocaust—is 
to place yourself beyond the pale of civilized discourse. . . . As Europe prepares to leave World War 
Two behind—as the last memorials are inaugurated, the last surviving combatants and victims 
honoured—the recovered memory of Europe’s dead Jews has become the very definition and 
guarantee of the continent’s restored humanity.  It wasn’t always so.”). 
76   See generally Larry Alexander & Michael Moore, Deontological Ethics, in Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2016), https://plato.stanford.edu
/entries/ethics-deontological/ [https://perma.cc/L9K8-MKHW] (last visited Feb. 1, 2019) 
(describing contrasting philosophical approaches, deontology, and consequentialism). 
77  Ed Whelan, Never Again, Nat’l Rev. Online (Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.nationalreview.com
/bench-memos/scalia-speaks-holocaust/ [https://perma.cc/WLY8-SUZ3].  There are, of course, 
other traditional derivations of these standards including those derived from western philosophy, 
both ancient and modern.   
78  See Wendy Warren, New England Bound 1 (2016) (“Between the sixteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, a period that roughly coincides with the colonial periods of North and South America, 
nearly thirteen million Africans were enslaved and shipped west across the Atlantic, while two to 
four million Native Americans were enslaved and traded by European colonists in the Americas.”).  
For a sampling of reading on the atrocities inflicted upon enslaved Americans, see Berry, supra 
T H E  U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  N E W  H A M P S H I R E  L A W  R E V I E W  1 7 : 2  ( 2 0 1 9 )  
338 
which drew the condemnation of Justice Scalia’s forebear and Chief Justice 
Marshall’s contemporary and friend, Joseph Story, who charged grand juries subject 
to his supervision as follows: 
The existence of Slavery under any shape is so repugnant to the natural rights of man 
and the dictates of justice, that it seems difficult to find for it any adequate justification.  
It undoubtedly had its origin in times of barbarism, and was the ordinary lot of those 
who were conquered in war.  It was supposed that the conqueror had a right to take the 
life of his captive, and by consequence might well bind him to perpetual servitude.  But 
the position itself on which this supposed right is founded, is not true. . . . And even if 
in such case it were possible to contend for the right of slavery . . . it is impossible that it 
can justly extend to his innocent offspring through the whole line of descent.79 
How then, should twenty-first century Americans assess legal actors who 
abetted and entrenched this most repugnant of early American institutions?  The 
answer must reference the complete and accurate depiction of the legal actors 
themselves, their body of work, and the historical forces at work that influenced 
their lives.  And yet the two books under review present their subject, Chief Justice 
John Marshall, in such remarkably different ways that we are forced to ask whether 
either book lives up to the demands of proper historical accounting. 
I I .  P R OF E S S OR  P AUL ’ S  HI S T OR Y  AS  T HE  P OL I S HI N G OF  MON UME N T S  T O 
UNT R UT H 
Almost two decades ago, at least one legal historian asked why any writer would 
offer another biography of Chief Justice Marshall given the number of prior efforts 
                                                                    
note 36, at 46–47, discussing the commodification of slave children, and Kaplan, supra note 49, at 
13, describing one of Lincoln’s reflections on slave children as follows:  
 Leaving Farmington, Lincoln boarded the aptly named Lebanon.  On board were twelve slaves, 
“chained six and six together . . . like so many fish upon a trot-line,” he later wrote to Mary Speed. . . . They 
were “being separated forever,” Lincoln wrote, “from the scenes of their childhood, their friends, their 
fathers, and mothers, and brothers and sisters, and many of them, from their wives and children, and 
going into perpetual slavery where the lash of the master is proverbially more ruthless and unrelenting.” 
Id.; see also Walter Johnson, River of Dark Dreams: Slavery and Empire in the Cotton 
Kingdom 28 (2013) (“Jackson spent the next fifteen years—first as a general in the U.S. Army, then 
as the military governor of Florida, and finally as the [P]resident of the United States—
supervising the ethnic cleansing and racial pacification of the south eastern United States.”); 
Sanford Levinson, Written in Stone: Public Monuments in Changing Societies 63–64 
(20th anniversary ed. 2018) (“Imagine our reaction if a German staat, perhaps inspired by South 
Carolina, decided to fly the swastika about its state capitol.”); Andres Resendez, The Other 
Slavery: The Uncovered Story of Indian Enslavement in America (2016). 
79  Finkelman, supra note 18, at 121 (quoting a grand jury charge of Justice Story). 
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in circulation.80  After all, Marshall and the Marshall Court have been the subject of 
numerous books over the past two centuries.81  In a C-SPAN lecture presenting his 
book to a live and televised audience, Professor Paul answered this question in the 
following way: 
The one thing probably most of you know about John Marshall is that he wrote this very 
famous, probably the most famous, decision of the Supreme Court, Marbury versus 
Madison, which establishes the principle of judicial review, which means that the 
Supreme Court can strike down laws that are unconstitutional.  But he was so much 
more than this.  Probably no one had a more enduring impact on our country than John 
Marshall.  And no one did more to hold together the fragile Union of our nation at a very 
difficult time without precedent.82    
As a result of these observations about Marshall, it became Paul’s goal “to 
describe the whole man.  To give you a sense of all of the different ways in which 
Marshall had contributed to our nation’s growth.”83  With regard to Marshall’s 
accomplishments as Chief Justice, Paul stated: 
As Chief Justice, [Marshall] brilliantly defended the independence of the judiciary 
against the attempts by the Republicans to impeach the Federalist Judges.  He affirmed 
the federal courts’ power to review the actions of the executive and of Congress.  He 
established the supremacy of the federal government over the states.  He promoted the 
idea of a national market that would promote commerce.  He protected private property 
and facilitated the growth of corporations and private colleges.  He defended the rights 
of the Native American tribes and established the foundations of Indian Law that are 
still in effect today.  He was the first judge to declare that international law is part of 
U.S. law.  And he upheld the rights of aliens and alien property.  And, finally, he 
safeguarded the freedom of speech against Jefferson’s . . . attempts to prosecute his 
political enemies for constructive treason.84 
In this summary of Marshall’s accomplishments, however, Paul makes no 
mention of Marshall’s treatment of American slavery as Chief Justice.  Yet, during 
                                                                    
80  Gerber, supra note 10, at 104 (“Put directly, do we really need another biography of John 
Marshall?”). 
81  See, e.g., Herbert A. Johnson, The Chief Justiceship of John Marshall, 1801–35 (1997); 
David Loth, Chief Justice John Marshall and the Growth of the Republic (1949); Allan 
B. Magruder, American Statesman John Marshall (Gaunt, Inc. 2009) (1885); David 
Robarge, A Chief Justice’s Progress: John Marshall from Revolutionary Virginia to the 
Supreme Court (2000). 
82  Without Precedent: Law Professor Joel Richard Paul Recounted the Political and Judicial Career of 
the Supreme Court’s Fourth Chief Justice, John Marshall, C-SPAN, https://www.c-span.org/video
/?441642-1/without-precedent [https://perma.cc/HH9W-3ERS] (last visited Jan. 24, 2019) 
(00:03:22). 
83  Id. (00:04:14). 
84  Id. (00:06:50). 
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Marshall’s tenure on the Court, it was that legal issue that would cause the country 
to erupt in civil war, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Americans 
and a series of fundamental changes to our Constitution.85  Paul’s biography 
proceeds as if Chief Justice Marshall and his slavery jurisprudence played almost no 
role in the events leading to the catastrophe of this episode in American history.  
Instead, Paul posits that Marshall served as a bulwark against disunion and the 
catastrophic consequences of slavery that drove the country to civil war.86    
To the extent Paul does devote attention to the subject, he casts Marshall as an 
opponent of slavery.  According to Paul, “Marshall’s professional success as a lawyer 
enabled him to avoid the more common route to wealth and influence in 
eighteenth-century Virginia as a slaveholding planter.”87  This conclusion—and 
Paul’s general perspective on Marshall and slavery—is almost entirely derivative of 
works by Marshall’s earlier biographers, and particularly Jean Edward Smith.88  Paul 
further observes:   
Marshall was not free of racial prejudice, and he did enjoy the comforts that his 
household slaves provided to him.  Marshall’s attitude toward African Americans was 
paternalistic.  He viewed his slaves as family members who needed his guidance and 
support.  There is no evidence that Marshall ever separated families or mistreated or 
whipped his slaves—as Thomas Jefferson did.  It appears that Marshall treated his slaves 
humanely, and on at least one occasion, he paid for a doctor to care for a slave woman 
who was ill.89 
Paul does not provide any register by which one is able to assess how he 
measures slavery’s impact on its victims.90  Instead, Paul describes Revolutionary-
                                                                    
85  Drew Gilpin Faust, The Republic of Suffering Death and the American Civil War 
11–12 (2008); see also In re Afr. Am. Slave Descendants Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d 721, 780 (2005), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part, and modified in part, 471 F.3d 754 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Generations of Americans were 
burdened with paying the social, political, and financial costs of this horrific War.”). 
86  See Jeremy Suri, Foreign Collusion Is as American as Apple Pie, Foreign Pol’y (Aug. 28, 2018), 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/08/28/foreign-collusion-is-as-american-as-apple-pie/ [https:
//perma.cc/5EYK-6RRG]; Paul, supra note 4, at 2–3, 440; see also supra text accompanying note 12. 
87  See Paul, supra note 4, at 45–46 (citing Newmyer, supra note 8, at 35).  Likewise, when Paul 
cites to Smith’s biography of Marshall, Smith makes no mention of Marshall’s need to engage in 
commercialized slavery.  Id. at 49–53 (citing Smith, supra note 8, at 145–46). 
88  See Paul, supra note 4, at 446–47 (citing Smith, supra note 8, at 145–46); cf. Smith, supra note 
8, at 488 (“The issue of slavery itself never came before the Marshall Court.”); Donald M. Roper, In 
Quest of Judicial Objectivity: The Marshall Court and the Legitimation of Slavery, 21 Stan. L. Rev. 532, 532 
(1969) (“Yet the isolation of the Marshall Court from the slavery controversy is more imagined than 
real.”). 
89  See Paul, supra note 4, at 47 (footnote omitted). 
90  Cf. W.E.B. Dubois, The Souls of Black Folk 8 (Penguin Books 2018) (1903).  Dubois writes: 
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era fears regarding the possibility of slave revolts, highlighting the threatened 
leveraging of slave power by British loyalists during the revolution and slave 
rebellions in Saint-Domingue.91  Paul also notes that Marshall handled lawsuits for 
and against slaves, sometimes pro bono, that he was part of the African colonization 
movement, and that he had a decades-long relationship with a slave, Robin 
Spurlock, who “made a strong impression on Marshall’s views about African 
Americans and slavery.”92  In a statement with no citation, Paul remarkably 
hypothesizes that Marshall may have been right to believe that the deportation of 
the entire slave population to Africa was the best solution for America’s race issues, 
given the benefit of historical hindsight.  He writes: 
Of course, most slaves had no ties to Africa and had no reason to leave their homeland 
for a foreign country.  Though today it seems unthinkable that the United States would 
have deported free blacks to Africa, to Marshall and his contemporaries it seemed just 
as unthinkable that whites would ever accept blacks as their social equals.  More than 
150 years after emancipation, it remains to be seen if Marshall was wrong.93 
This striking observation would raise red flags, even if it were to be considered 
historically factual, because it addresses complex topics with imprecision and does 
not indicate whether any of its propositions are supported by primary or secondary 
sources.94  The reader is left to ask:   
 
                                                                    
 Away back in the days of bondage they thought to see in one divine event the end of all doubt and 
disappointment; few men ever worshipped Freedom with half such unquestioning faith as did the 
American Negro for two centuries.  To him, so far as he thought and dreamed, slavery was indeed the sum 
of all villainies, the cause of all sorrow, the root of all prejudice . . . .  
Id.; Booker T. Washington, Up from Slavery 1 (1995) (“My life had its beginning in the midst 
of the most miserable, desolate, and discouraging surroundings.  This was so, however, not 
because my owners were especially cruel, for they were not, as compared with many others.”). 
91  See Paul, supra note 4, at 16–17, 47.  For a far more complete recitation of dynamics between 
British offers of freedom to American slaves and American efforts to suppress freedom and the 
violence that ensued against men, women, and children, see Lepore, supra note 49, at 94–108. 
92  See Paul, supra note 4, at 49; cf. Anne Twitty, Before Dred Scott: Slavery and Legal 
Culture in the American Confluence, 1787–1857 118 (2018) (“For these individuals, 
prosecuting freedom suits may have simply been a way for them to live out a paternalist fantasy 
or foster a reputation as a benefactor to the oppressed.”). 
93  See Paul, supra note 4, at 48; cf. Twitty, supra note 92, at 112 (“A racist, largely ineffectual body 
of well-intentioned Christians, the ACS acknowledged slavery as a curse but embraced the notion 
that people of color had no place in America’s divinely ordained future.”). 
94  See Barbara W. Tuchman, History by the Ounce, in Practicing History 39 (Paperback ed., 
Random House Trade 2014) (1981) (“When I come across a generalization or a general statement 
in history unsupported by illustration I am instantly on guard; my reaction is, ‘Show me.’”). 
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§ Is this international law professor endorsing Marshall’s goal of the mass 
and involuntary deportation of slaves to Africa?    
§ Is he even somehow endorsing that policy or a variant of it, now, rather 
than the goal of continued work toward a more perfect union?    
§ What are we to think of this sort of appraisal, coming as it does in 2018 
and beyond, during a time of great upheaval in regard to the treatment of 
immigrants in this country? 
§ If Marshall stood for the expulsion of African slaves, how considered was 
this viewpoint?  How moral was it?95 
There is a deep level of irresponsibility in Paul’s commentary on the subject, 
even as he dutifully concedes that Marshall, “like Jefferson, was guilty of hypocrisy—
fighting for liberty in the Revolutionary War while denying it to others.”96  And 
having crossed the threshold by writing a biography that does not merely describe 
history, but casts judgment upon history in admiring terms, Paul cannot take refuge 
in the argument that the past cannot be judged by the standards of the present.97  
Paul’s credibility as an historian and public intellectual must therefore be assessed 
against his own conclusions about Marshall, their foundation in fact and good 
scholarship, and a defensible application of values.   
According to Paul, for Marshall, “the struggle for human dignity was 
experienced in the cases he won, in his support of African colonization, in his 
defense of the federal power to end slavery, and in the humanity and respect he 
showed to the least among us in his quotidian routines.”98  Paul’s treatment of 
Marshall’s career as Chief Justice confirms this conclusion.  His biography follows 
the standard treatment of Marshall’s contributions to private and public law in 
discussing famous cases such as Marbury v. Madison99 and Cohens v. Virginia.100  Paul 
casts these decisions as seminal moments in the history of the nation and Marshall, 
                                                                    
95  For some recent commentary on ancient sources discussing the treatment of foreigners as a 
separate virtue, see Homer, The Odyssey 24–26 (Emily Wilson trans., W. W. Norton & Co. 1st ed. 
2018) (discussing Xenia, or  “guest-friendship,” and its moral, historical, and literary standing in 
Ancient Greece); see also Rebecca Newberger Goldstein, The Odyssey and the Other, The Atlantic 
(Dec. 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/12/the-odyssey-and-the-other
/544110/ [https://perma.cc/AQ6F-ZFXD] (discussing the same). 
96  Paul, supra note 4, at 53. 
97  Richard J. Evans, In Defense of History 15 (1st Am. ed. 1999) (attributing this perspective 
to German historian Leopold von Ranke). 
98  Paul, supra note 4, at 53. 
99  5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
100  19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821). 
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as a courageous stabilizing force, as their author.101  His book devotes very little 
space to the substantial debate over the importance of Marshall’s most famous 
decisions, despite a substantial corpus of material on the subject.102  Paul also does 
not appear to be aware of commentary arguing, more generally, that the United 
States Supreme Court has played a pernicious role in the life of our nation over its 
history, in part, because of the very power of judicial review associated with 
Marshall’s jurisprudence.103 
In other words, Paul has written an entire book about Marshall and, yet, has 
failed to acknowledge the substantial debate about his contributions to American 
law.104  Paul’s description of cases involving slavery—the most important legal and 
political issue facing the nation in the nineteenth century—is very limited.  He 
devotes some space to the case known as The Antelope,105 in which the United States 
resolved the fate of slaves discovered aboard an American vessel that was engaging 
in illegal trafficking by a process amounting to a lottery: dispensing freedom to 
some and casting others back to slavery, nearly at random.106  Apologizing for his 
subject’s performance in this context, Paul concluded that: 
Personally, Marshall viewed slavery and the slave trade as an abomination.  
Marshall’s decision in [The] Antelope betrayed this conviction.  Why did he step back from 
the opportunity to affirm an emerging principle of international law outlawing the slave 
                                                                    
101  See Paul, supra note 4, at 256–59 (discussing Marbury) and 339–47 (discussing Cohens). 
102  See, e.g., Klarman, supra note 8; see also Keith E. Whittington & Amanda Rinderle, Making a 
Mountain Out of a Molehill? Marbury and the Construction of the Constitutional Canon, 39 Hastings 
Const. L.Q. 823, 824–25 (2011) (suggesting that Marbury became prominent because of references 
to it in Brown v. Board of Education, even as it was given very little attention in the nineteenth 
century). 
103  See, e.g., Ian Millhiser, Injustices: The Supreme Court’s History of Comforting the 
Comfortable and Afflicting the Afflicted xiii (2015).  As Millhiser describes: 
 The justices . . . have routinely committed two complementary sins against the Constitution.  
They’ve embraced extra-constitutional limits on the government’s ability to protect the most vulnerable 
Americans, while simultaneously refusing to enforce rights that are explicitly enshrined in the 
Constitution’s text.  And they paved a trail of misery as a result. 
Id. 
104   Gordon S. Wood, The Origins of Judicial Review Revisited, or How the Marshall Court Made More 
Out of Less, 56 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 787, 788 (1999) (“These revisionist scholars contend that the 
origins of judicial review can best be located in the years following the Marshall Court, in the post-
Civil War era at the end of the nineteenth century.”). 
105  The Antelope, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 546 (1827); The Antelope, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 413 (1826); The 
Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825). 
106  See Paul, supra note 4, at 352–61. 
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trade?  Marshall could surely see the arc of history bending in that direction.107 
This last conclusion about Marshall’s perspective comes with no supporting 
citation.108 
Perhaps more remarkable, given that he is an international historian who 
jumped into the task of judicial biography-writing, Professor Paul appears unaware 
of the work of Chief Justice Marshall’s contemporary in Great Britain, Lord 
Mansfield.109  In the Somerset case110—Mansfield’s most famous case as England’s 
chief judicial magistrate—Mansfield ruled against the interests of slavery, granting 
habeas corpus relief to a man seized by American slavers who brought him ashore 
in England and then sought to reassert ownership over him.111  While his ruling on 
slavery, rendered in 1772, occurred in a society that remained committed to the 
trade, Mansfield opined:  
The state of slavery is of such a nature, that it is incapable of being introduced on any 
reasons, moral or political; but only positive law, which preserves its force long after the 
reasons, occasion, and time itself from whence it was created, is erased from memory: 
it’s so odious, that nothing can be suffered to support it but positive law.112   
Historians have postulated that this decision supported the cause of abolitionism 
generally and was used by coordinate courts to promote freedom in Great Britain.113     
                                                                    
107  Paul, supra note 4, at 361 (footnote omitted). 
108  See id.  
109  Marshall admired Mansfield.  See Norman S. Poser, Lord Mansfield: Justice in the Age 
of Reason 397 (2013).  Poser writes: 
 Chief Justice John Marshall of the United States Supreme Court, a Federalist in party politics, 
disagreed with Jefferson, calling Mansfield “one of the greatest Judges who ever sat on any bench, [and] 
who has done more than any other to remove those technical impediments which grow out of a different 
state of society, [and] too long continued to obstruct the course of substantial justice.”   
Id.  That fact should not be confused with an effort to offer Mansfield as a model in his own right.  
See id. at 297–98 (“Long after deciding the Somerset case, Mansfield continued to regard black slaves 
not as human beings having inalienable rights but as chattels—personal property that their 
owners could dispose of as they wished.”).  Poser goes on to detail a decision in which Mansfield 
gives a bloodless description of slaves thrown overboard by slavers in terms equivalent to lost 
property.  Id.  
110  Somerset v. Stewart, (1772) 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B.). 
111  Id. at 510. 
112  Id. 
113  Poser, supra note 109, at 298 (asserting that “[a]lthough the Somerset decision did not end 
slavery or the slave trade . . . it provided support for the growing abolitionist sentiment” and “[l]ess 
than two weeks after the decision[,]” led to a ruling freeing a slave from bondage before Scottish 
courts); see also William M. Wiecek, Somerset: Lord Mansfield and the Legitimacy of Slavery in the 
Anglo-American World, 42 U. Chi. L. Rev. 86, 88 (1974) (“Somerset is a fascinating milestone in Anglo-
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Paul does not assess Marshall against this backdrop, though it is clear that 
Marshall shied away from similar displays in his own jurisprudence.  Instead, he 
explains Marshall’s decisions by hypothesizing that Marshall “believed obedience to 
the law trumped moral judgments.  According to this view, Marshall saw judges as 
neutral referees merely applying fixed legal rules.”114  This conclusion also comes 
unaccompanied by any citation to a case, letter, or other writing written by Marshall 
on the subject.115   
Paul further speculates that Marshall sought to shore up the United States 
against the domestic threat of disunion between the sections and threats from 
foreign powers offended by the prosecution of foreigners and their property in the 
United States courts, citing other Marshall biographers (though not Finkelman or 
other skeptics who have criticized Marshall)—his assertion is entirely derivative of 
these prior works.116  He does not discuss the numerous cases in which Marshall 
decided the fate of slaves seeking freedom from slavery, though scholars other than 
Finkelman have addressed the issue.117  Paul does not address what Marshall’s 
personal papers reveal about his relationship to slavery—facts that Finkelman 
uncovered in his simultaneous study of Marshall.  His treatment of the African slave 
trade jurisprudence further fails to account for important cases decided by the 
Marshall Court that are described by Professor Finkelman.118    
Other scholars have argued that Marshall’s true concern as a jurist was the 
establishment of a stable legal environment for the protection of property rights.  
“The belief that property ownership was essential for self-government and political 
liberty had long been a central premise of Anglo-American constitutionalism” in the 
                                                                    
American legal history . . . . It was a . . . benchmark in the development of the law of personal 
liberty.”). 
114  Paul, supra note 4, at 361–62 (footnote omitted). 
115  See id.  
116  See Paul, supra note 4, at 470 n.59 (citing Newmyer, supra note 8; Smith, supra note 8). 
117  See Newmyer, supra note 8, at 424–34; see also Leslie Friedman Goldstein, Slavery and the 
Marshall Court: Preventing “Oppressions of the Minority Party”?, 67 Md. L. Rev. 166, 175 (2007).  
According to Goldstein:  
 During the Marshall Court years, issues concerning slavery arose in the following contexts: (1) 
property disputes between white people over particular slaves, which the Court handled according to 
rules that would have applied to other chattel property; (2) lawsuits by slaves claiming their freedom on 
one or another ground; and (3) questions of criminal law once federal law banned the export and import 
of slaves.   
Id. (footnotes omitted) (collecting and tabulating slavery cases). 
118  See, e.g., Finkelman, supra note 18, at 58–75 (describing Mima Queen v. Hepburn, 11 U.S. (7 
Cranch) 290 (1813); Scott v. Negro Ben, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 3 (1810); Scott v. Negro London, 7 U.S. (3 
Cranch) 324 (1806); Telfair v. Stead’s Ex’rs, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 407 (1805)). 
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era of the Marshall Court.119  An analysis of these perspectives as they relate to 
Marshall’s true record on slavery would provide the sort of window into Marshall’s 
jurisprudence that Paul is unable to provide.  At least one scholar has suggested that 
Marshall’s failure to address slavery may have been the product of concern for his 
own personal well-being, having observed the reaction of South Carolina to one 
colleague’s anti-slavery rulings.120   
Professor Paul does not address Marshall’s expansive view of property, and he 
is unaware of Marshall’s own investment in human property.  Had he done so, he 
would have had to contend with comparing Marshall to more courageous judicial 
figures.  Marshall’s concern for his own personal well-being, safety, and 
professional reputation, for instance, could be compared to the federal judges who 
risked personal and professional retaliation to further the cause of freedom and 
equality in the United States.121 
Paul’s failure to acknowledge and address this perspective renders him 
incapable of squaring the pathbreaking nature of the Dartmouth College case—
protecting the provinces of private corporate law—on the one hand, with Marshall’s 
resistance to the freedom of human beings on the other.  Ultimately, his failure to 
address these features of Marshall’s personal history and jurisprudence in a manner 
consistent with its treatment by other historians—and Professor Finkelman’s 
specifically—deeply undermines Paul’s conclusion that Marshall “had the courage 
of his imagination, the wisdom to find common ground, and the grace to hold 
                                                                    
119  Ely, Jr., supra note 44, at 1025. 
120  See Roper, supra note 88, at 532–34.  Roper explains: 
William Johnson’s public stand further complicated matters.  Without challenging the institution of 
slavery, the South Carolinian courageously protested the failure to accord slaves due process in the 
summary and frequently hysterical proceedings that followed in the wake of the Denmark Vesey incident. 
. . . 
 . . . . 
 . . . . The protest following the decision caused Marshall to write Story of Johnson’s plight, and of his 
own escape via a Falstaffian tactic from a similar situation. 
Id. 
121  See, e.g., Robert C. McFadden, Frank M. Johnson Jr., Judge Whose Rulings Helped Desegregate the 
South, Dies at 80, N.Y. Times (July 24, 1999),  https://www.nytimes.com/1999/07/24/us/frank-m-
johnson-jr-judge-whose-rulings-helped-desegregate-the-south-dies-at-80.html [https://perma.
cc/D239-DUUF] (describing a federal district judge who enforced anti-segregation laws despite 
personal and professional threats); see also Gilbert King, Devil in the Grove (2012) (describing 
the heroic lawyering of Thurgood Marshall as he defended accused black citizens in the American 
South despite the life-threatening environment created by the surrounding white population). 
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together a fragile union.”122 
I I I .  P R OF E S S OR  F I NK E L MAN’ S  MOR E  T R UT HF UL  HI S T OR I C A L  R E C K ONI NG  
AS  AN UNVAR NI S HE D ASS E S S ME NT  OF  MAR S HAL L  
Professor Finkelman’s much shorter book is much longer on engagement with 
primary source historical records, even though it not only addresses Chief Justice 
Marshall, but also two other historical figures: Justice Joseph Story and Chief Justice 
Roger Taney.  Supreme Injustice is not, in fact, a biography of Marshall, and it does 
not seek to present him as a complete man.  It is a book that focuses on Marshall’s 
relationship with slavery as a legal institution, offered in the face of two centuries 
of praise for a monumental jurist.123  Surveying Marshall’s personal papers, 
Finkelman’s book finds in Marshall a man devoted to slavery and to trafficking in 
human lives to promote the interests of his family and their holdings.124  Unlike Paul, 
Finkelman does the traditional work of the historian, relying upon historical 
materials revealed in his notes to track Marshall’s personal behavior.   
With reference to Marshall’s personal papers, Finkelman reveals that Marshall 
bought, sold, and devised scores of slaves from his younger years as an attorney 
through his later years as Chief Justice.125  In the process, Professor Finkelman 
demonstrates that “[t]he Great Chief Justice was constantly in the business of 
buying, giving away, and sometimes selling slaves.”126  Professor Finkelman 
therefore undercuts the inaccurate portraits of Marshall painted by his most well-
known biographers, whose views are adopted uncritically by Paul.  As Finkelman 
writes: 
It is simply wrong to claim that Marshall “experienced slavery primarily” as an 
urban slave owner or “was never involved in large-scale agriculture” or “had no 
significant holdings” of slaves.  Nor can we accept the claim that “it is doubtful that he 
traded in slaves.”127 
                                                                    
122  See Paul, supra note 4, at 440.  See generally Tuchman, supra note 94, at 39 (“Text after text in 
American History is published every year, each repeating on this question more or less what his 
predecessor has said before, with no further enlightenment.”). 
123  See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The Myth of Marbury, in Arguing Marbury v. Madison 65 (Mark 
Tushnet ed. 2005) (“It is often said that in Marbury v. Madison, the greatest judicial decision ever 
rendered, the legendary Chief Justice John Marshall created the power of judicial review.” 
(footnotes omitted)).  
124  Finkelman, supra note 18, at 36–48. 
125  Id. at 42–46. 
126  Id. at 47. 
127  Id. at 47 n.43, (citing Newmyer, supra note 8, at 434; Smith, supra note 8, at 162, 164–68). 
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At an event sponsored by the John Marshall Foundation at the Virginia Museum 
of History and Culture, Professor Finkelman, while discussing his book before an 
audience, shed greater light on how he drew these startling conclusions.128  During 
his address, Finkelman described a series of commonsense tasks in which he 
engaged as an historian, which his predecessors, quite astonishingly, had failed to 
perform despite undertaking the project of attempting to capture Marshall’s life 
and jurisprudence.129  When the subject of his novel approach to Marshall arose in 
the context of the discussion, Finkelman explained: “I’m the first one to do it 
because other historians have not done it.”130  The task involved reading John 
Marshall’s will carefully and following the sources and locations of Marshall’s 
wealth.131  This reading revealed that Marshall owned and transacted a far greater 
number of slaves than any of Marshall’s prior biographers had reported.132 
Professor Finkelman’s discovery of these facts surprised him so much that he 
felt obliged to test his discoveries through communication with other historians: 
I was so startled by this that I wrote a couple of paragraphs and sent it to other Marshall 
scholars and said, “Can I be right?”  Because it’s very weird.  You spend your whole life 
doing history.  You’re reading books that your friends have written. . . . I can’t be right 
and you’re all wrong. . . . One of the things we see is, within my profession there are 
people who are so in love with their subject or so blinded by their desire to reach a 
certain conclusion that they don’t want to follow the evidence where the evidence takes 
you.133 
He would have to level the same critique at Professor Paul.  To bolster his claim 
that Marshall was a civil libertarian in disguise, Paul writes: “[t]he relationship 
between Marshall and [Robin] Spurlock was remarkable, and it seems likely that 
Spurlock made a strong impression on Marshall’s views about African Americans 
and slavery.”134  Professor Finkelman notes, however, that Marshall would only 
manumit Spurlock at the end of Marshall’s life if Spurlock agreed to leave 
Virginia.135  If Spurlock wished to remain in Virginia, it would have required him to 
                                                                    
128  See Supreme Injustice: Slavery in the Nation’s Highest Court, YouTube (May 21, 2018), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Oyy9ZwmlMnQ [https://perma.cc/FR2J-2X4N].  
129  See id. (00:32:45–00:33:30). 
130  See id. (00:32:40–00:32:45). 
131  See id. (00:33:00–00:37:00). 
132  See id. 
133  See id. (00:35:01–00:36:15). 
134  Paul, supra note 4, at 49. 
135  Finkelman, supra note 18, at 43. 
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engage an attorney to argue his case and could have cast him into poverty.136  
Moreover, notwithstanding Marshall’s long-standing personal relationship with 
Robin Spurlock, his papers reveal Spurlock to be an inveterate and cruel racist who, 
appearing before the Virginia legislature, argued that free black citizens in Virginia 
were a blot on society and should be repatriated to other lands.137  Worse, Marshall’s 
personal records demonstrate that he thought very little about separating families 
in order to advance his own family’s interests.138 
Professor Finkelman also rebuts notions that Marshall had a clean 
jurisprudential record with regard to slavery by simply entering a few search terms 
into a computerized database in an effort to review whether Marshall participated 
in decisions involving the issue.139  In surveying Marshall’s judicial decisions, 
Finkelman finds a jurist famous for his judicial creativity who contributed little of 
it to advancing the cause of freedom for slaves or alleged slaves.140  
These tendencies are perhaps on starkest display in cases involving suits for 
freedom brought by individuals whose appeals were heard by the Marshall Court in 
the early nineteenth century.  In those decisions, readers first see Marshall loosen 
evidentiary standards in violation of a statute’s language to rule against an alleged 
slave.141  Readers then see Marshall deploy a formalistic approach to the rule against 
hearsay in favor of a slaveholder in one case, while loosening evidentiary 
requirements against a slave challenging his bondage in another.142 
In one striking example of such judicial decision-making—the case of Scott v. 
Negro Ben143—Marshall dispensed with a statutorily mandated element of proof to 
rule in favor of a slaveholder who sought to justify his importation of a slave into 
Maryland against the slave’s suit for freedom.144  Indeed, when presented with two 
possible constructions of the statute—one that would have affirmed the trial court’s 
                                                                    
136  Id. at 43–44. 
137  Id. at 51. 
138  Id. at 45. 
139  See Supreme Injustice, supra note 128 (00:37:22–00:38:10). 
140  Finkelman, supra note 18, at 107–10 (“John Marshall is rightly seen as one of the most 
innovative jurists in our history. . . . When human liberty was at stake he was less engaged.”); see 
Supreme Injustice, supra note 128 (00:37:30–00:40:00) (describing how Marshall decided all of the 
cases involving slavery that he authored against slaves and reversed three jury verdicts rendered 
in the interests of slaves by juries comprised entirely of white men). 
141  See infra pp. 36–37. 
142  See infra pp. 36–37. 
143  10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 3 (1810). 
144  Id. at 6–7. 
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decision to free the man and one that would cast him back into litigation over his 
freedom— Marshall provided a pro-slavery construction.  According to Marshall:  
The great object of the [statutory] proviso [at issue in the case] was to permit 
persons, actually migrating into the state of Maryland, to bring with them property of 
this description which had been within the United States a sufficient time to exclude 
the danger of its being imported into America for the particular purpose.  The great 
object of the provision was, that the fact itself should accord with this intention.  The 
manner in which that fact should be proved was a very subordinate consideration.  Certainly the 
provisions of the law ought not to be so construed as to defect its object, unless the 
language be such as absolutely to require this construction.145 
This decision appears to be the ancestor of another notoriously racist decision 
in the area of statutory construction—the much-decried Holy Trinity Church case146 
in which the United States Supreme Court invoked the same absurdity doctrine, 
declaring that the United States is a “Christian nation” and that other religions were 
“impostors.”147 
By contrast, in the 1813 case Mima Queen v. Hepburn148—decided only three years 
after Scott v. Negro Ben—Marshall affirmed the D.C. Circuit’s refusal to take 
deposition testimony regarding the heritage of plaintiffs seeking freedom.149  These 
same depositions were successfully admitted in earlier freedom petitions by Queen 
relatives in Maryland state court proceedings—a decision affirmed by the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland, the state’s highest court.150  In Mima Queen, where a 
slaveowner’s property interests were placed at risk, the manner in which a fact was 
                                                                    
145  Id. (emphasis added). 
146  Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892). 
147  Id. at 460, 471 (“The language of the act, if construed literally, evidently leads to an absurd 
result.  If a literal construction of the words of a statute be absurd, the act must be so construed 
as to avoid the absurdity.”); see also William S. Blatt, Missing the Mark: An Overlooked Statute Redefines 
the Debate over Statutory Interpretation, 104 Nw. U. L. Rev. Colloquy 147, 150–51 (2009) (describing 
textualist critique of this “intentionalist” decision in Holy Trinity). 
148  11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 290 (1813). 
149  Id. at 293, 296–97. 
150  Id. at 298 (Duvall, J., dissenting) (“[T]he issue may be proved by hearsay evidence, if the fact 
is of such antiquity that living testimony cannot be procured.  Such was the opinion of the judges 
of the general Court of Maryland, and their decision was affirmed by the unanimous opinion of 
the judges of the High Court of Appeals in the last resort, after full argument by the ablest counsel 
at the bar.  I think the decision was correct.”); Summary of the Mima Queen case, O Say Can You 
See: Early Washington, D.C., Law & Family, http://earlywashingtondc.org/cases
/oscys.caseid.0011 [https://perma.cc/A4D7-GLLZ] (last visited Feb. 28, 2019) (“The D.C. Court 
disallowed as evidence some critical testimony about . . . Queen’s origins and status in depositions 
taken in the 1790s in Maryland cases brought by Queen relatives.”). 
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to be proved became paramount.151  The hearsay testimony at issue established that 
the plaintiff descended from a free ancestor.152  Marshall applied the hearsay 
prohibition expansively to exclude evidence that could not be obtained except 
through hearsay—information about a person who was dead and whose 
contemporaries were dead.153  The decision includes the following revealing 
articulation of principle as Finkelman recites in his book:    
If the circumstance that the eye witnesses of any fact be dead should justify the 
introduction of testimony to establish that fact from hearsay, no man could feel safe in 
any property, a claim to which might be supported by proof so easily obtained.154 
This observation provoked the dissent of Justice Gabriel Duvall, who noted that 
freedom challenges must often depend on testimony that could not be provided by 
live witnesses and that Marshall’s broad prohibition rendered such testimony an 
impossibility in the run of cases.155  According to Duvall:   
[P]eople of color from their helpless condition under the uncontrolled authority of a 
master, are entitled to all reasonable protection.  A decision that hearsay evidence in 
such cases shall not be admitted, cuts up by the roots all claims of the kind, and puts a 
final end to them, unless the claim should arise from a fact of recent date, and such a 
case will seldom, perhaps never, occur.156 
These decisions, and others Finkelman highlights in his survey of Marshall’s 
jurisprudence, demonstrate how Marshall deployed law to buttress slave-owning 
interests to the detriment of freedom and are difficult to square with reference to 
neutral principles or precedent.157  And while legal historians largely have ignored 
these decisions, recent scholarship demonstrates that they took place within an area 
of law of great importance to antebellum America: the status of humans as slaves or 
citizens before American courts.158    
Finkelman also surveys Marshall’s decisions on the slave trade and finds him to 
have ruled in favor of the freedom of the slave traders in each instance where 
                                                                    
151  Id. at 296 (majority opinion). 
152  Id. at 294–95. 
153  Id. at 296. 
154  Finkelman, supra note 18, at 63–64 (quoting Mima Queen, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 296). 
155  Mima Queen, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 298 (Duvall, J. dissenting). 
156  Id. at 299. 
157  See, e.g., Finkelman, supra note 18, at 67 (describing the Marshall Court’s use of hearsay 
evidence to deprive a slave of freedom in Mason v. Matilda, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 590 (1827)). 
158  See generally Twitty, supra note 92, at 244–74 (describing and charting the volume of litigation 
in the middle sections of the country regarding the status of slaves challenging bondage in 
American courts). 
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Marshall reviewed prosecutions of this illegal activity.159  During his address at the 
Virginia Museum of History and Culture, Professor Finkelman combined all of this 
evidence to hypothesize about Marshall’s slavery jurisprudence as follows:  
I can imagine John Marshall sitting in his chambers thinking about this man whose 
mother has been declared free by Maryland courts. . . . And Marshall is saying, I could 
have bought this guy in Washington, D.C. . . . And I don’t want to lose my slaves merely 
because I did not know that the slave I was buying was not a slave . . . It’s not a pretty 
picture.160 
The picture that Professor Finkelman draws of Marshall is of a jurist who 
embraced views more consistent with those articulated by Chief Justice Taney’s 
decision in Dred Scott—that slaves and freed blacks could never obtain status as legal 
citizens under the United States Constitution.  In his Dred Scott decision, Taney 
answered these legal questions for everyone in Marshall’s shoes—slave-owners 
subject to the instability of interstate travel and a nation divided with regard to the 
legal status of slavery.  Indeed, Finkelman forces us to imagine that Taney’s 
approach was only a more virulent and outspoken ideological strand of judicial 
racism than Marshall’s more diplomatic effort to infect American jurisprudence 
with de jure racism.  References to Marshall as a legal authority require us to assess 
him in a manner reflecting all that this accurate depiction implies about Marshall’s 
jurisprudential approach and moral value system. 
C ONC L US I ON 
Professor John Hart Ely dedicated his great twentieth century contribution to 
constitutional law, Democracy and Distrust, to Chief Justice Earl Warren, stating, 
“[y]ou don’t need many heroes if you choose carefully.”161  In Without Precedent, 
Professor Paul has very clearly chosen Chief Justice Marshall as his hero, and his 
biography reflects his great admiration of Marshall as a figure whose 
accomplishments extended beyond his role as Chief Justice.  However, he has done 
so in a manner that perpetuates untruths about Marshall and his contemporaries 
and dishonors the memories of humans harmed by Marshall.   
                                                                    
159  See Finkelman, supra note 18, at 27–28; see also Supreme Injustice, supra note 128 (00:42:30–
00:43:27). 
160  Supreme Injustice, supra note 128 (00:45:02–00:45:43). 
161  John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review v (1980); see also 
Harold Hongju Koh, Choosing Heroes Carefully, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 723 (2004) (providing an example 
of the benefits of admiring worthy legal thinkers).  See generally John Hart Ely, The Chief, 88 Harv. 
L. Rev. 11, 12 (1974) (“The Chief did something that few will ever do: he did what he set out to do.  
And that was to make the American Dream more broadly accessible than it had ever been before.”). 
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Alternatively, in Supreme Injustice, Professor Finkelman infuses the historical 
record on Marshall with forensic information and facilitates a truthful accounting 
of history with respect to an American figure we have mythologized.  
Notwithstanding the plaudits heaped upon Professor Paul by renowned legal 
academics, Professor Finkelman’s shorter book is the better and more defensible 
contribution to the fields of American law and American history, even as it deeply 
undermines the standing of a figure of monumental importance to both.  It is a book 
worthy of our attention as we continue to appraise, assess, and deploy as authority 
the monuments of our past. 
